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iABSTRACT
This article-based dissertation investigates the constructedness and expansion
of expertise in the contemporary public sphere. The dissertation is motivated
by the phenomenon of salient public perplexity and competing claims to
expertise in the contemporary public sphere around science-related public
issues where expertise has relevance to the practice and actions of people. As
this phenomenon has been notably salient regarding healthy eating as a public
issue, empirically the dissertation especially deals with the constructedness of
public expertise around this issue. Theoretically and methodologically, it
provides new insights on the relationally constructed nature of expertise in the
contemporary public sphere and how to investigate it. The dissertation
especially makes explicit the ways in which new types of social actors claiming
expertise, as well as established, credentialed experts, construct their
authority in the contemporary public sphere in the context of issues where
expertise touches upon everyday life. It also provides new perspective on the
role of experts and the way in which journalism and public engagement with
science activities, as cultural practices that centrally mediate expertise in the
contemporary public sphere, come to construct public expertise.
The theoretical framework of the dissertation is grounded in the relational
perspective on expertise as developed within a constellation of social studies
of science literature. From this perspective, expertise and its recognition are
approached as constituted by, and constructed in, social relations. In the
empirical studies of the dissertation, concepts from the relational literature on
expertise are put to analytical use. Furthermore, some novel concepts and
typologies are developed that can be further utilised in the empirical study of
public expertise. Methodological relativism, as developed within the sociology
of scientific knowledge, methodologically underpins the symmetrical
approach to investigating public expertise in the dissertation. The materials
collected and analysed in the four articles consist of observational materials
and a questionnaire collected from a public engagement with science event,
blog posts by popular nutrition counselling bloggers and academic experts,
and in-depth interviews with journalists and visible experts on healthy eating.
The four original, empirical articles analyse and illuminate the
constructedness and expansion of expertise in the contemporary public sphere
by focusing on the different, central arenas and social actors involved in
claiming and mediating expertise in public. Article I provides an analysis of
interactive framings and their negotiation in an informal public engagement
with science event. It contributes to the understanding of the interactional
dynamics and how these are negotiated between the expert panellists, lay
people and event facilitators in these types of public events that commonly aim
to dissolve epistemic hierarchy and authority. Article II investigates the
rhetorical strategies and cultural resources drawn upon by six popular diet
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bloggers in establishing credibility both for their claims and for themselves as
providers of dietary advice, which are also compared to those utilised by
institutional experts contributing to the blog of the National Institute of Health
and Welfare. The findings of Article II especially illuminate the dialectical
constructedness of public expertise in the case of healthy eating, which
involves much struggle over expert credibility and authority in contemporary
society. It also provides insights into how popular diet bloggers establish
public authority on dietary issues. Article III investigates journalists’ accounts
on how they choose expert sources when covering healthy eating and how they
judge the expertise of these sources. It identifies different repertoires, in which
each journalistic judgement of dietetic expertise is interpreted and constructed
in different terms. The findings of Article III illuminate the variety of the kinds
of considerations that constitute journalists’ judgement of expertise, and also
how these exceed the issue of recognising and considering the sources’
technical expertise. Article IV analyses visible scientists and scientifically
trained practitioners’ interview accounts of their role as public experts on
healthy eating. It elaborates their different ethoses and boundary-work
through which they come to construct different role identities as public
experts. It identifies three different public expert role identities based on the
analysis and highlights the enacted nature of these role identities, which reflect
different views of expertise and of acting as an expert in the science-public
boundary.
The concluding chapter discusses the constructedness and expansion of
expertise in the contemporary public sphere, based on the findings of the four
empirical articles, on a more theoretical plane. In doing so, the concluding
discussion also critically engages with Collins and Evans’ normative theory of
expertise in social studies of science by further theoretically discussing how
expertise in the contemporary public sphere is centrally tied to the
establishment and recognition of expert authority, and not just to displaying
and assessing technical expertise. It is argued that central to how expertise in
the contemporary public sphere is relationally constructed is how knowledge
drawn upon and advice provided are made tangible and considered to bear
relevance in relation to the everyday experience and considerations of the
intended public. The ways in which the related issues of individualisation and
consumerism, as well as rationality and interests, relate to the constructedness
of expertise in the contemporary public sphere are also highlighted. However,
it is emphasised in the concluding discussion, based on the empirical findings,
that there is not just one way, but a variety of ways, in which social actors
actively establish expert authority by navigating these socio-cultural dynamics
and positioning themselves as public experts.
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11 INTRODUCTION
“There is at least one problem: such a wide variety of experts from different
fields have declared themselves as experts that it has not been possible to
figure out what is the truth. The experts are often in a complete disagreement
with each other.” Paula Salovaara, Managing Editor, Helsingin Sanomat
newspaper, 17.12.2011.
One of the characteristic features of many science-related debates in the
contemporary public sphere has to do with the issue of who actually can, and
should, provide the public with authoritative advice and what to make of
claims to expertise. As the above quotation – extracted from an editorial note
on how to deal with the issue of expertise during a simultaneous heightened
debate on low-carbohydrate diets and dietary fats in Finland – illustrates, this
issue sometimes even becomes explicitly part of the public discussion about
the science-related issue at hand. That such issues concerning public authority
emerge in relation to expertise in public discourse, and can even become
highly pervasive, is intriguing. It can also be considered as somewhat puzzling
in the sense that what constitutes authoritative, trustworthy advice on science-
related public issues should, after all, be relatively straightforward from a
commonsense perspective as “an obvious answer is that authority flows from
expertise” (Shapin, 2004: 45), that is, from the technical ability to act and do
things based on deep domain-specific understanding. This is also what has
crucially motivated the writing of this dissertation, which is an inquiry
focusing from various perspectives on how expertise is constructed,
negotiated and judged, and in what ways this relates to the expansion of
expertise, in the contemporary public sphere.
Of course public perplexity and disagreement about expertise do not
pervade equally, if at all, all areas of social life, especially if expertise is mostly
relevant in relation to fundamental esoteric scientific issues, such as “whether
twice two equals four, or whether DNA is the genetic substance” (Shapin,
2004: 47). However, when these do emerge it is typically with respect to issues
in which the practical and moral aspect of “what we should do” is
characteristically involved (Ibid.: 47). Therefore, all of the empirical studies
(Articles I–IV) in this dissertation were conducted with the idea that such an
aspect is involved. Since, especially around healthy eating, the issue of
expertise has recently been salient and continuously debated in the public
sphere in Finland, and in many other countries, and is fundamentally
intertwined with the issue of what to do (e.g. Shapin, 2003; 2007a), the
empirics especially deal with this area (Articles II–IV). The findings and
discussion of this dissertation, then, cannot be understood to provide any
generalised theory about expertise in late-modern public life. However, they
illuminate and contribute to the understanding of some of the socio-cultural
2dynamics of expertise and public authority, concerning empirically especially
public dietary expertise. Theoretically and methodologically, this dissertation
also advances our understanding of the relationally constructed nature of
expertise in the contemporary public sphere and how to investigate this. As
this is an article-based dissertation by publication, I find it important to note
that although the central empirical work done for the dissertation is presented
in a summarised form in the main part of the text of this thesis, for a more
comprehensive view of the components of this work, and the detailed
arguments involved in them, it is necessary to take a look at the actual research
articles that essentially constitute the core of the dissertation and the findings
made.
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY AND
CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUBSTUDIES
Notably, an influential normative approach in social studies on expertise
(Collins & Evans, 2007; Collins & Evans, 2017) tends to point out the
interrelatedness of the type of public discourse and sentiment about expertise
conveyed in the beginning quote above to the decline of public trust in science
and scientific experts, and argues that both scholars and citizens should,
therefore, focus more on who the experts actually are, and how to recognise
them, in terms of what kind of abilities the social actors really possess.
Although it is empirically debatable whether, and to what extent, public trust
in science has declined in recent decades (see e.g. Smith & Son, 2013; Castell
et al., 2014), and would, therefore, influence public recognition and
conceptions of expertise to begin with, modern societies and citizens are
certainly very much dependent on and exposed to expertise, while expertise is,
at the same time, widely contested and negotiated publicly (Nowotny, 2000;
Turner, 2003; Boyce, 2006). The general rise in the education level of the
population in many western democracies, such as in Finland, and the fact that
it has become easier to communicate and take part in discussions in the public
sphere due the pervasiveness of the internet and social media, conceivably
affords us the opportunity to scrutinise and negotiate expert authority and
propositions. As science exerts considerable authority in contemporary
societies, especially the authority of institutionalised forms of scientific expert
advice and expert “establishments” have been subject to contestation, for
example in the cases of vaccines (e.g. Blume, 2006) and healthy eating (e.g.
Gunnarson & Elam, 2012; Jauho, 2016), by social movements as well as
ordinary laypeople, when institutional expertise has been perceived to be
imposed on the public without sufficient scientific self-criticism, or to exclude
other types of knowledge.
One-way, marketing oriented public communication that aims to “sell
science” to the public has also, arguably, had an impact on the perceived public
authority of science and scientific experts in the public sphere and society in
3general (e.g. Felt et al., 2007). Emphasising the importance of dialogue
between scientists and laypeople has thus been a growing trend in the public
communication of science, although this type of approach has not been
without its practical difficulties (see Powell & Colin, 2008; Kurath & Gisler,
2009). Furthermore, the shift from measuring public understanding of science
to emphasising dialogue and public engagement with science (PES), and the
related policy shift to more generally democratise science and expertise, have
also been paradigmatic and consciously supported by social scientists,
especially by Science and Technology Studies (hereafter STS) scholars, as well
as by policy-makers. The aim has been a broader, inclusive use of knowledge
and expertise in society, which has, however, involved tensions with scientific
and other professionalised forms of expertise (Nowotny, 2003; Maasen &
Weingart, 2005; Lövbrand, Pielke & Beck, 2010). The theoretical
repercussions of such tensions have also been widely debated by STS and the
public communications of science scholars (Collins & Evans, 2002; Wynne,
2003; Jasanoff, 2003; Rip, 2003).
Moreover, for example, organised PES activities also involve constitutive
issues having to do with power relations (e.g. Davies, 2013). Such issues
pertain to tensions over public authority and the propositional rights of the
participants, and characteristically emerge at the interactional level, as the
fitting together of different perspectives and ways of knowing is usually
difficult. It is common to maintain a certain hierarchy and to favour expert
subject positions within such activities, as well as to colonise lay positions by
expert speakers (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley & Tutton, 2007). Also, scientists
often refrain from wider expert engagement and maintain a narrow role by
falling back on their technical expertise in the face of difficult ethical or
political questions, which necessitates considerations and efforts from
facilitators of such events (Radstake et al., 2009). Article I investigates such
aspects relating to public expertise in public engagement events by providing
an analysis of interaction between expert speakers, young people as lay
participants and event facilitators in an informal, facilitated PES event. It
contributes specifically to the understanding of the interactional dynamics and
negotiation of authority in these types of public events.
However, in addition to such more active, systematic attempts to expand
and democratise expertise at the levels of policy and practice, the spectrum of
types of social actors utilised as experts has also expanded in the media, and
increasingly, for example, sources with practical experience on the issue at
hand are attributed with expertise by journalists (Albæk, 2011). For example
“field experts”, such as dietitians, nutrition therapists and personal trainers,
are increasingly endowed with epistemic authority and consulted for expert
advice in the contemporary media and public sphere (Setälä & Väliverronen,
2014). Moreover, especially in many areas pertaining to the everyday life of
people, such as in the case of healthy eating, there is also a variety of lay and
semi-professional social actors who lack institutional expert status or
credentials actively aiming to establish themselves as public authorities for
4example through popular literature (Shapin, 2007a) or the blogosphere
(Article II). As Article II in this dissertation demonstrates, the ways in which
such authors establish credibility for their claims and public authority for
themselves builds characteristically on argumentation grounded in personal
experience and personal measurements to establish a connection to
commonsense thinking about healthy eating, and to construct the authors as
relatable characters, rather than on displaying technical expertise and
knowledge. Furthermore, it is also made explicit in Article II that these
credibility strategies notably work in dialectical opposition to the kind of
argumentation of scientific experts that builds on an understanding of
probabilities and population-based causalities to compete for epistemic
authority over public dietary understanding. Article II, then, contributes
especially to the understanding of the rhetorical and dialectical
constructedness of public expertise in the case of healthy eating, which
involves considerable struggle over expert authority and credibility in the
contemporary public sphere, and provides insights into what constitutes the
emergence and proliferation of new types of actors as public authorities on
dietary issues.
The proliferation of new types of agents claiming to be and passing as
epistemic authorities also has effects on the status and authority of scientists
and scientifically trained professionals as public experts, that is, when they
provide advice and commentary on practical problems (Peters, 2008). It is
important to note that science as a social institution, and scientific experts as
agents representing this institution, have also become more dependent on
public legitimation due to macrosocial structural changes related to the
institutional interlocking of science and the media as the media has begun to
have a more pervasive influence in society (Weingart, 1998; Rödder & Schäfer,
2010). However, the contemporary public sphere, on a more cultural level, has
also become an important arena where struggles over the symbolic legitimacy
of expert authority take place in modern societies, and where scientific experts
have to increasingly compete over the public recognition of expertise as well
as public authority and credibility (Arnoldi, 2007; Shapin, 2007a; Penders,
2014). This exerts pressure on scientific experts to consider how to construct
and communicate the content of their advice to the public in order for it to be
influential. In addition, this competitive cultural and communicative
environment also inevitably influences considerations of how and what it is to
be an expert authority in the public sphere. Article IV focuses on this based on
interviews with scientists and scientifically trained professionals (e.g.
dietitians) who are experienced in acting as public experts on dietary issues. It
analyses how these experts perceive and come to construct different public
expert role identities, by focusing especially on their ethos and identity- and
boundary-work through which they construct these role identities. This study
contributes to a better understanding of the multiplicity of expert role
identities and what constitutes expertise in the contemporary public sphere,
5as well as the normative orientation of these enacted role identities, which
reflect different views of expertise in society.
Arguably, new types of mechanisms for gaining and attributing authority
have also emerged ? to the extent that the term “media-derived authority” has
been coined (Herbst, 2003; cf. Weber´s [1921–22]1978: 212?301 classical
typology of legitimate authority). In the context of public expertise, this means
that it has become easier to be recognised as an expert authority by gaining
public visibility, and especially by accommodating to the ways the media
operates. The judgement of expertise itself has, then, become more crucial in
order to consider the credibility and authoritativeness of claims made from
expert subject positions. Especially journalists, who commonly use expert
sources in order to increase objectivity, add credibility and provide facts
necessarily face the task of making continuous judgements about expertise.
However, research investigating the role and use of expert sources in the
media, and especially how journalists assess and judge the expertise of
sources, is scarce, although some studies do exist (e.g. Boyce, 2006). Article
III contributes to this gap in understanding journalistic judgement of expertise
in the contemporary public sphere by investigating the kinds of considerations
that constitute journalists’ judgement in attributing an authoritative, expert
voice to sources in the area of diet, which arguably centrally influences the
social shaping and public recognition of expertise in regard to healthy eating.
It also elucidates the value and relevance of other types of knowledge and
understanding in relation to scientific knowledge when considering expert
sources, especially when dealing with health issues.
62 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter centres on theory in the social study of expertise by focusing
especially on those aspects in the existing literature that bear relevance in the
context of this work. The theoretical framework, central concepts and
analytical tools that I put to use in this dissertation to investigate the
constructedness of public expertise derive from relational theory in the social
study of expertise, to which this dissertation theoretically contributes, and
these are therefore introduced hand-in-hand with elaborating this approach.
Methodological relativism, as formulated in the sociology of scientific
knowledge (hereafter SSK), is also introduced as it grounds the way in which
public expertise is methodologically approached in this thesis.
2.1 THE SOCIAL STUDY OF EXPERTISE
In psychological and educational literature, the standard approach to
expertise is commonly one of skill acquisition, that is, what does it take for an
(adult) individual to become an expert in terms of skill development through
practice, and what does this tell us about the nature of expertise and especially
how it is acquired (e.g. Dreyfus, 2004). This type of approach to expertise is
constitutively both individualist and realist by nature. Expertise is investigated
from this perspective as something that an individual comes to possess as a
skill through concentrated practice, and it is important to understand how this
happens and what stages it involves.
Social studies of science and expertise literature, introduced and surveyed
in this chapter, are characteristically more collectivist by nature in that
communities and social and cultural processes are viewed as constitutive of
expertise and the emergence of expert social actors. However, there is no
single, unified understanding of expertise and experts in this literature, but
rather the different theoretical approaches that do exist vary from normative-
realist to more relational approaches. Therefore, it is crucial to survey these
different approaches that centrally touch upon the socio-cultural and societal
aspects of expertise to provide an understanding of how expertise is
approached in them, and to position this dissertation theoretically and
epistemologically in the field of the social study of expertise. Although the
theory and methodology in this dissertation are grounded in the relational
perspective, the normative-realist approach is introduced and surveyed in this
chapter as it aims to provide a theoretical counterpoint to the relational
approach to expertise. This dissertation also critically engages with the
normative-realist approach in discussing the constructedness and expansion
of expertise in the contemporary public sphere. The normative-realist
perspective involves a distinctive understanding in which the essence of
7expertise is viewed in terms of the technical ability possessed by social actors,
and through which such matters as recognition and judgement of expertise are
also viewed, as explained further below.
2.2 THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE: THE NORMATIVE
THEORY OF EXPERTISE
An influential realist perspective in the social study of expertise emerges from
the work of STS scholars Harry Collins and Robert Evans (comprehensively
presented in e.g. Collins & Evans, 2007) and their colleagues. Based on their
investigations, they outline a vast, programmatic approach to the social study
of expertise which is neither possible nor purposeful to introduce here in full
detail, but which has central aspects that are important to introduce briefly as
their “normative theory of expertise” saliently touches upon such social
dimensions as recognition and judgement of expertise, in both specialist and
public settings. Their approach fundamentally aims to overcome the issue that
expertise, and reliance on experts, should have to do with expert authority and
credibility by offering an alternative to this based on their theory. To be clear,
it is important to note here that while the theory and conceptual tools of the
normative theory of expertise are not utilised in this dissertation to investigate
expertise, an elaboration of these is crucial to provide an understanding and
to discuss how Collins and Evans’ normative theory aims to provide this
alternative, and to be able to situate relational theorising about expertise with
respect to this.
Collins and Evans (e.g. 2002; 2007) describe their theory as normative
because one of the central aims of their theory is to provide a priori guidance
on how to recognise, consider and make judgements concerning expertise
based on their “periodic table of expertises” which is an empirically grounded
typology of the kinds of expert ability that social actors can come to possess by
gaining experience through immersion into expert communities. Therefore,
notably, the approach of Collins and Evans rather explicitly indicates that
expertise is fundamentally not something that can be acquired merely through
theoretical immersion, by reading and learning a lot about things, but what
importantly constitutes expertise is tacit knowledge and experience gained
through socialisation to expert communities.
The theory notes that there is ubiquitous expertise, such as mastery of
language and societal norms, which is globally possessed by people because
such abilities are central to life in society. Of central interest in the approach
are, however, forms of specialist expertise. With respect to specialist expertise,
the typology of expertise makes explicit that the ability to fully contribute to a
domain is a form of specialist expertise, contributory expertise, which is
acquired through socialisation to both the practice and language of the
community. However, the theory also importantly points out that linguistic
socialisation, in particular, is crucial for developing a distinct kind of specialist
8expertise, interactional expertise, which involves the ability to sufficiently
interact with other competent, expert actors in the specific domain in question
(Collins & Evans, 2007; Collins, 2011).1 Kinds of meta-expertise ? expertise
about expertise ? are also explicated as a category of expertise, which also
involves more ubiquitous, but also specialist forms of meta-expertise, of which
especially referred expertise is explicated as a kind of specialist meta-expertise
where a social actor, for example, a manager in a project, has gained expertise
in one field and is able to utilise this expertise in another field (Collins & Evans,
2007: 64?67). In addition “sociological discrimination” is also later
introduced in the framework of normative theory of expertise as a kind of
meta-expertise, a specialist social expertise that can be used to make
judgements concerning experts and expert propositions as it is “expertise in
respect of social behaviour in the sciences that can be transmuted into
technical judgments” (Collins & Weinel, 2011: 411).
As the short summary of the typologisation of expertise in the theory above
makes explicit, expertise is treated in this approach as socially constituted but
strictly in terms of kinds of actual technical abilities and competence that are
involved in different types of expertise. Notably, the rationale for aiming to
treat and typologise expertise in these terms is fundamentally linked to Collins
and Evans’ discontent for expertise to be approached in terms of attributable
social status and authority, and with talk about lay expertise, which, for them,
is a problematic oxymoron (e.g. Collins & Evans, 2002; Collins & Evans,
2007). According to Collins and Evans such issues also increasingly emerge
due to the legitimacy problems of science and scientific expertise in
contemporary societies – that have been publicly salient especially in the
context of issues involving risk and controversy – which have been aimed to
tackle by means of extending expertise through public participation in techno-
scientific decision-making and discussion. Collins and Evans claim that the
problem of legitimacy is therefore replaced by the problem of extension, that
is, how far can expertise extend in dealing with techno-scientific public issues,
and on what basis social actors should be included as experts in technical
decision-making. In relation to this, it is also argued that the technical phase
in dealing with such issues should be distinguished from a distinct political
phase in which citizens should have a say as political actors in a democracy
(Collins & Evans, 2007; see also Collins, Weinel & Evans, 2010), although the
rationale and practical possibility of making such distinction has been
contested by other STS scholars (e.g. Wynne, 2003; Jasanoff, 2003).
While not delving further into the political underpinnings of the normative
theory of expertise, it is important to draw attention to how the kind of
typology of expertise that Collins and Evans introduce is related to this issue
1 Notably, there is a definitive autobiographical element as a source of developing the concept of
interactional expertise as this theorising centrally stems from Collins’ decades-long immersion into the
gravitational wave physicists community as a sociologist of science during which he acquired
interactional expertise in this domain (see e.g. Collins, 2004).
9of expansion of expertise in that it (1) makes explicit that expertise should be
understood to be possessed more broadly than just by those with formal
credentials because social actors can possess different types of expertise
acquired through experience and socialisation despite of credentials, but also
(2) simultaneously strives to demonstrate where the limits of who should be
able to claim some sort of expertise can be drawn if expertise is understood in
terms of technical ability, as in their theory. Therefore, Collins and Evans (e.g.
2007) also (re)consider influential case studies within STS literature,
especially Brian Wynne’s studies (1992; 1996) concerning Cumbrian sheep
farmers after the Chernobyl fallout and Steven Epstein’s studies (e.g. 1995;
1996) of AIDS activists in which the notion of lay expertise figures centrally, to
argue that in fact the people talked about in these studies should not be
understood as lay experts, but as highly competent experience-based experts.
In describing Epstein’s case studies the account of AIDS activists is also
especially focused on how they came to acquire interactional expertise which
Collins and Evans link to these activists being recognised as expert social
actors with relevant claims (Collins & Evans, 2007: 52?54), although notably
in Epstein’s original work (see e.g. 1995) specific emphasis is on the
mechanisms and tactics through which the activists gained credibility and an
authoritative voice as expert actors. It is therefore not evident that this
recognition had merely to do with the activists’ acquisition of expert ability
through linguistic socialisation to the biomedical culture, but rather
necessitated forms of credibility work from them in which the moral and
political issues were very much intertwined with the epistemic issues (Epstein,
2011). Article II in this dissertation also makes explicit how public recognition
and authority are practically achieved by focusing on the strategies through
which popular lay- and semi-professional actors establish credibility for their
claims and themselves in the dietetic blogosphere.
Such downplaying of the argumentative and cultural aspects concerning
the public recognition of expertise and its achievement in the context of
science-related issues of public relevance ? that the supplanting of these
aspects with the issue of acquisition of technical ability in considering other
scholars’ case studies indicates – also raises a broader question. This is that
while the normative theory of expertise can prescribe types of expertise to be
recognised on the basis of technical ability these involve, can constitutive
issues related to recognition and judgement of expertise be detached from the
issues of authority and credibility in the way that the approach aspires to.
Collins and Evans eagerly point out that their theory should not be conceived
as having to do with issues of how scientific experts relate to society, or at least
“is only indirectly about them” (2002: 236), and that status acquisition and
similar “attribution” issues related to expertise in society are not their concern.
Indeed, insofar as the normative theory of expertise is applied to some of its
core issues, such as the important notion of interactional expertise and its
acquisition and uses in different domains, the theory can certainly function in
isolation from science, expertise and society issues to point out how such types
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of expert ability can be recognised and put to use. However, its direct and
explicit oppositional positioning to all kinds of relational and constructionist
theories of expertise, and argumentation and different examples about
unwarranted and dubious claims to expertise also outside of the domain of
science, such as in the public sphere, indicate that while the theory is not about
status and authority acquisition it certainly does touch upon the issue of
expertise in society (Collins & Evans, 2002; Collins & Evans, 2007; Collins,
Weinel & Evans, 2010; Collins & Weinel, 2011; Collins, 2014; Collins & Evans,
2017). It is just that the issue of recognition and judgement of expertise is
made in the approach to be strictly about expertise as technical ability as a way
to supplant the issue of expert authority and credibility, and basing trust and
judgement on these. A way to do so is offered by pointing out how judgements
about technical ability in the face of claims to expertise can, and should, be
made based on the normative theory of expertise.
The societal usefulness of viewing expertise more in terms of the normative
theory of expertise is also notably discussed within the approach through
examples, such as the case of the American actress Jenny McCarthy’s status
and authority (as a vaccine critic) in public discussion on vaccines, where the
aim is to point out how certain social actors have become attributed with
expertise on knowledge-intensive issues because of having already established
media status and having made persuasive claims based on anecdotal evidence
while lacking in technical ability and proper scientific understanding with
respect to the issue at hand, and therefore not actually possessing any
expertise in the way explained by the normative theory (Collins, 2014). For one
thing, however, the exact role and function of the normative theory of expertise
for this kind of exercise of considering expertise is perhaps not completely
obvious as the point can be made that it is “not much of a challenge to show
that Jenny McCarthy is not an expert on scientific issues related to
vaccination” (Ylikoski, 2016: 463). However, as the theory disavows
consideration of what the recognition of expertise in cases like these might
have to do with issues of public authority and credibility, and how these are
established and judged, it can also only account for and offer a framework for
investigating expertise in such cases by referring back to the theory’s own
principles on how expertise should be recognised and judged in terms of the
technical ability possessed by social actors involved in such cases based on the
prescribed typological categories in the theory. In other words, fundamentally,
the issues of recognition and judgement of expertise are strictly fixed in the
approach to understanding expertise as a technical ability.
While the normative theory of expertise, then, provides an operationable
basis for recognising and judging expertise as kinds of technical ability,
arguably this way of approaching expertise does not pervade universally, or as
a standard, in societies and in everyday life. People strive to recognise and
make judgements concerning expertise regardless of whether they have a
grasp of this theory, or any other theory of expertise for that matter. Therefore
it remains a crucial empirical question to investigate these issues beyond the
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framework of the normative theory of expertise that focuses on expertise as a
technical ability. How is it possible that social actors such as Jenny McCarthy,
for instance, get recognised as something like expert speakers on crucial public
health issues such as vaccines? How is this recognition achieved by such social
actors? What constitutes judgements about expertise in areas where different
claims to expertise and knowledge exist and compete?
Notably, the focus in the normative theory of expertise on technical ability
can also guide social inquiry methodologically in a way that can lead to rather
restricted things to say about the basis of how, for example, journalists, who
importantly mediate and influence the public recognition of expertise, judge
expertise – other than having recourse to the normative argument that it
would be good if journalists would focus more on the technical ability of
sources who are utilised as experts (see Boyce, 2006). However, as Article III
in this dissertation demonstrates, journalists who report on healthy eating
make sense of the journalistic judgement of expertise through a variety of
repertoires, which exceed the specific issue of expert sources’ technical ability
and involve tensions, but together illuminate what for journalists themselves
constitutes the everyday framework of their judgement and use of expertise.
Arguably, making this explicit is of importance for a comprehensive
understanding of how expertise is judged by journalists as mediators of
expertise in the contemporary public sphere, and how their judgement exceeds
the issue of the technical ability of their expert sources. For this purpose, for
example, the kind of empirically grounded typology offered on the basis of
investigating journalists’ repertoires in Article III importantly also provides
methodological support to uncover and analyse journalistic judgement of
expertise.
The issue of authority and expertise also figures somewhat paradoxically in
Collins and Evans’ normative-realist approach in the sense that it is
underpinned by concern over scientific authority and the status of scientific
expertise in democratic societies, while at the same time exactly aiming to offer
a theoretical alternative to approaching expertise in terms of authority and
status. Especially noteworthy in relation to this is that the approach insists that
focus is directed strictly to actual technical ability possessed by social actors in
cases in which non-scientists seem to have gained expert status and authority
on problematic grounds, as in the Jenny McCarthy case. In contrast, when it
comes to discussion of scientists as experts, the issue of authority is elevated
as it is extensively argued by Collins and Evans that the authoritative standing
of science and scientists in democratic societies should, by default, be
embraced not on technical, but on moral grounds. The crux of their
argumentation regarding this is that it is important to recognise and take into
account that scientists aspire to act based on values ideally involved in science,
such as ideal Mertonian norms (e.g. Merton, 1973). Therefore, Collins and
Evans assert that it is important to choose to place confidence in expertise
morally constituted by such scientific values, although the choice cannot be
rationally justified (e.g. Collins, Weinel & Evans, 2010; Collins & Evans,
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2017).2 As a consequence of the fact that the authority of scientific expertise is
in this way understood as a matter of ethical choice, the approach is also
detached from concerns over the ways in which scientific experts achieve and
maintain their authority in society and in the public sphere, or face problems
in doing so, although expressing normative concern over the issue.
2.3 THE RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE AS THE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXPERTISE AS
RELATIONALLY CONSTITUTED AND CONSTRUCTED
In contrast to the programmatic normative-realist approach, the relational
perspective in the social study of expertise emerges more from a constellation
of studies within STS, empirically especially from within its historically central
subfield of SSK. These studies have demonstrated and theorised different
aspects of how expertise and its recognition are constituted by, and
constructed in, social relations (e.g. Jasanoff, 1990; Wynne, 1992; Shapin,
1994; Epstein, 1995; Jasanoff, 1995; Epstein, 1996; Wynne, 1996; Gieryn,
1999; Turner, 2003; Lynch et al., 2008). There are also investigations on
expertise that are situated more within the rhetoric of science and
communication studies that in a similar vein argue and demonstrate how
expertise is relational by explicating it as a discursive rhetorical achievement
that depends on establishing and maintaining an expert position in relation to
an audience through rhetorical work and the construction of an ethos (e.g.
Lyne & Howe; 1990; Taylor, 1992; Miller, 2003; Hartelius, 2008).
While the normative theory of expertise rather views the issue of authority
as problematic in relation to expertise, and therefore aims to theoretically
tackle it, characteristic of these relational studies on expertise is that authority
and the related issue of credibility are approached exactly as the central issues
to be empirically investigated, as well as theorised based on empirically well-
informed grounds, in order to understand expertise in society and culture. As
this dissertation approaches expertise from the relational perspective, it is
important to first explicate authority and credibility as central theoretical
concepts in investigating the constructedness of expertise in the contemporary
public sphere. It is important to note that, while these concepts are especially
relevant when studying knowledge and expertise in public domains, the utility
of these concepts also extends beyond the public dimension, to such areas as
analysing authority and credibility in intrascientific settings, or governance or
policy settings where scientific expertise counters other forms of knowledge
and expertise (e.g. Shapin, 1995a; Turner, 2003). Therefore, it is especially
2 A question can therefore also be raised concerning how symmetrical the normative theory (Bloor,
1976) is as a sociological theory of expertise, if this type of difference in explanation and argumentation
are involved.
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such relational literature on expertise that has previously scrutinised how
expert authority and credibility are constructed in public that is surveyed here.
The central notions and analytical tools utilised in this dissertation are also
elaborated (in section 2.3.2.). However, notably, issues of authority and
credibility also figure in seminal studies that have elaborated how expertise is
relationally constituted and constructed in the policy domain (see e.g.
Jasanoff, 1990) and in the judicial domain (see e.g. Jasanoff, 1995; Lynch et
al. 2008).
2.3.1 AUTHORITY, CREDIBILITY AND APPROACHING EXPERTISE AS
RELATIONAL
As authority is primarily a political concept, commonly understood in political
theory especially in terms of legitimate domination of kinds as described for
example by Max Weber ([1921–22]1978: 212?301), what is its relation to
expertise as the characteristically knowledge-based capacity to act in social
life? For one thing, the issue of authoritative expert steering of society without
experts being directly accountable in a democratic society (Turner, 2003) has
been a central concern and topic in social theory (e.g. Habermas, 1984; 1987;
Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992). However, as Stephen Turner (2003) points out,
there is also the further, separate issue of the “cognitive authority” of experts,
that Robert Merton (1976) initially raises, that concerns itself with experts as
providers of authoritative advice in society, which is a conceptually relevant
relational notion in the context of this thesis. Turner, usefully, further
elaborates cognitive authority, or cognately epistemic authority, as a kind of
authority by noting that while, in political theory terms, authority would
contrast to knowledge: “the term makes sense as an analogue to ‘moral
authority’. And there is of course an earlier, and perhaps more fundamental,
notion of auctoritas as authorship. In all of these cases is the notion that
‘authority’ has at first hand something that others – subjects or listeners – get
at second hand by way of authority.” (Turner, 2003: 24, [cursivation of
auctoritas in original]).
This makes explicit the basic relation of how knowledge is embedded in,
and mediated through, authority in society. As Steven Shapin notes, despite
the rationalist-individualist tradition of contemporary western societies:
“almost all of our stock of knowledge […] is held by courtesy, through reliance
on others, on the basis of authority and trust.” (Shapin, 2004: 46). Moreover,
Shapin also importantly notes that despite the considerable historical effort
especially of scientists aiming to detach themselves from moral “ought”
questions, the kind of epistemic authority often sought after through reliance
on scientific, or other forms of, expertise in late-modern culture is indeed
moral authority, which could provide knowledgeable guidance not so much on
how things are, but what to do (e.g. Shapin, 1995b; Shapin, 2004; Shapin,
2007a; Shapin, 2007b).
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To a considerable extent, it is indeed expertise in contemporary societies
that figures as a source of authoritative advice, and in which public trust is
placed (Turner, 2003; Shapin, 2004). However, characteristically, that
expertise is also “almost always external: it belongs to someone else and our
problem is how to recognise it, access it, and mobilise it” (Shapin, 2004: 46).
However, regarding this, there is also the issue with expertise that it “cannot
be known directly” (Shapin, 2004: 46). Therefore, while other experts with
similar technical training may recognise expert claims as valid, the public
needs to recognise and accept expert claims on some other grounds,
fundamentally on the authority of the experts making the claims (Turner,
2003: 25). This makes it crucial in understanding the relation of experts and
expertise to public to grasp what indeed constitutes expert authority ? how is
it established and maintained ? as Turner (2003: 25) also further points out,
and also how is it negotiated and judged.
Turner (2003: 25?46) also provides a general typology of expert-audience
relations in society based on paying theoretical attention to the kind of
audience for which each type of expert is an epistemic authority. Turner’s
typology consists of five types of experts as epistemic authorities, which can be
roughly summarised as follows. Type I experts are scientific experts, such as
physicists, whose epistemic authority as experts is basically generally
recognised in contemporary societies as their expertise is understood to be the
kind of constitutive expertise that enables, for example, the development of
advanced technologies. Type II experts, such as theological experts, have a
specific, restricted audience in society for whom they are epistemic authorities.
Type III experts, such as therapists and popular authors, create their own
following by providing expert advice that their audience finds useful. This can
also allow a broader claim to expertise through appeal to the testimony of
people who have benefitted from their advice. Type IV experts are promoting
a cause and are subsidised to claim expertise to persuade the public about
some specific choice or action based on these experts’ views. Type V experts
have an audience that is primarily not the public but rather professionals with
discretionary powers, such as professionals in public administration.
Importantly, this typology makes explicit, on a general, ideal-typical level, the
different kinds of epistemic authority relations between experts and
audiences, as well as how some experts and their expertise can be understood
to have more established and general audiences than others in society. The
notion that experts are epistemic authorities with respect to audiences also
draws attention to how expertise in society is not so much about providing
technical knowledge and understanding, but about providing expert advice
that is of use and actionable. This is especially the case when it comes to
expertise in the public sphere in that public expertise crucially relates to the
explanation of practical problems that are of public relevance and to providing
advice for the affected public to deal with the issue at hand (Peters, 2008; Rip,
1985).
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However, although Turner’s typology draws attention to the importance of
paying attention to the relation of epistemic authority in thinking about
expertise and gives a structural overview of the kinds of expert-audience
authority relations, especially much of SSK literature (e.g. Barnes & Shapin,
1979; Gieryn, 1983; Wynne, 1992; Wynne, 1996; Shapin, 1995a; Barnes, Bloor
& Henry, 1996; Gieryn, 1999) has made theoretically and empirically explicit
how the epistemic authority of even the most paradigmatic kind of scientific
expertise in society and in public life is by no means static, but rather is
contingent and subject to consideration and negotiation. As the sociologist of
science Thomas Gieryn, who was a student of Merton, points out: “Epistemic
authority does not exist as an omnipresent, but rather is enacted as people
debate (and ultimately decide) where to locate the legitimate jurisdiction over
natural facts” (Gieryn 1999: 15). In this dissertation, the focus is in this vein
also on investigating expertise as something that is actively constructed,
shaped and maintained in public life.
SSK scholarship has especially theorised and demonstrated how achieving
credibility is central for social actors and their claims to be recognised and
accepted as epistemically authoritative, and how achieving credibility
necessitates active work from social actors (e.g. Wynne, 1992; 1996; Shapin,
1995a; Epstein, 1995; 1996; Gieryn, 1999). In this view, as elaborated well by
Shapin (1995a), it is acknowledged that, as validity is not necessarily a
guarantee of credibility when it comes to knowledge and expertise in society,
it is important to empirically scrutinise the grounds and ways in which
credibility for these is achieved. Furthermore, credibility is defined rather as
the “outcome of contingent social and cultural practice” (Shapin, 1995a: 257)
than as any measurable, predefined variables. In this dissertation, credibility
is also understood in these terms with respect to epistemic authority, and is
especially conceptually drawn upon in Article II to demonstrate how public
credibility is constructed in the dietetic blogosphere.
2.3.2 RELATIONALITY AND THE CONSTRUCTEDNESS OF EXPERTISE
IN PUBLIC LIFE: THEORETICAL NOTIONS AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS
In the previous section, I provided an elaboration of how the concepts of
authority and credibility, and the advice-giving nature of expertise, are defined
and understood in the relational approach to expertise in which this
dissertation is grounded. The purpose of this section is to elaborate the specific
notions and analytical tools that are utilised and built upon in this study to
investigate the constructedness of expertise in the contemporary public
sphere.
Boundary-work and the relational construction of public expert role
identities
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The epistemic authority of science and scientific experts is by no means self-
evident in society and is subject to contestation. Scientists themselves indeed
also often engage in active efforts to sustain, or expand, their epistemic
authority through boundary-work, that is, by attributing “selected
characteristics to the institution of science […] for purposes of constructing a
social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as ‘non-science’”
(Gieryn, 1983: 782). Gieryn, who coined the concept, further notes that
boundary-work is essentially a practical rhetorical activity of demarcating
science and scientific expertise by contrasting these in relation to other forms
of knowledge and expertise. It is especially common in public science to
describe what science is for the public in order to sustain its public authority
(Gieryn, 1983; 1999; cf. Collins and Evans, 2007 emphasis on a priori
demarcation of what counts as expertise based on their normative theory, as
described in section 2.2.). However, Gieryn notes that the attribution of
characteristics to science and scientific expertise in such demarcation work is
contingent and flexible, dependent on, and in relation to, which other kind of
knowledge or expertise the contrast is drawn. Gieryn (e.g. 1999: 37?64; also 
concisely in 1983) demonstrates this especially in his historical case study of
the double boundary-work of the physicist John Tyndall who, as a prominent
public figure speaking for science in Victorian England, flexibly attributed
different characteristics to science and scientific expertise to demarcate it, on
one hand, from religion, and on the other, from engineering. Both aspects
presented a different type of overall challenge for the public authority of
science and scientists in the era; religion as a more established, ancient
authority (also on the natural world), and engineering knowledge and
expertise as the contemporary competition of which practical achievements
were easy for the public to recognise. By way of a rough summary, and to
convey Gieryn’s point about the flexibility of the demarcation work, Tyndall
contrasted science favourably to religion by describing science and scientific
expertise as practically useful, empirical, sceptical and objective; whereas in
contrast to engineering Tyndall emphasised science basically as more
fundamental than engineering and its associated expertise by attributing to
science that it is: theoretical, produces the knowledge on which engineering
also depends, works through systemic experimentation, seeks to discover
things as an end in itself, and is intellectually important in human culture
(Gieryn, 1983: 785?787).
The concept of boundary-work is, then, useful in investigating how
scientific experts construct and maintain their authority in public life, where
their epistemic authority especially is fundamentally open to contestation and
competition from different directions. It can be used to make explicit how and
what kind of demarcations are actually drawn in contrast to other forms of
knowledge and expertise to sustain their public authority (Gieryn, 1983; 1999;
also e.g. Cassidy, 2006; Parry, 2009; Moore & Stilgoe, 2009). However, while
boundary-work is mostly used in the Gierynian vein to scrutinise the external
aspects of how scientists demarcate their activities and expertise from
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something else in public, Article IV in this dissertation acknowledges the
notion of, and focuses on, identity construction through boundary-work and
sensemaking (Lam, 2010; Rijswoud, 2012; Rijswoud, 2014) in interviews with
scientists and scientifically trained professionals (e.g. dietitians) who are
experienced in acting as public experts on dietary issues to make explicit their
different role identities as public experts and how these are relationally
constructed.
The notion of boundary-work can, indeed, be usefully theoretically
appropriated to illuminate how science-based experts actively construct their
role identities when they need to navigate the boundary between science and
another domain as for example Alice Lam (2010) does with respect to how
scientists construct and negotiate different role identities in the university-
industry boundary (in the academic-entrepreneurial axis). Similarly,
navigating the science-public boundary involves active identity construction
(Rijswoud, 2012; 2014; Davies & Horst, 2016). And as Erwin van Rijswoud
(2012; 2014), and Article IV here later, demonstrate experts crucially construct
their role as public experts relationally by orienting themselves in relation to
the public, to other social actors, and also to other ways of being and acting as
a public expert, as outlined in Article IV. Ethos, or moral character, is also a
central component of public expert identities, and experts need to consider
what kind of expert ethos to maintain when acting in public life (Rijswoud,
2012). Therefore, Article IV also draws on the notion of the constructed nature
of expert ethos (Hartelius, 2008) and shows how different public expert role
identities involve constructing and displaying different ethoses. Moreover,
while Rijswoud (2012; 2014) relies on what he terms as a biographical-
narrative approach ? that works methodologically in a rather specific way to
provide an in-depth, longitudinal insight to the relational identity construction
and boundary drawing of specific individual scientists as public experts ? the
analytical identification and elaboration of different role identities specifically
(as in Lam, 2010) in how experts navigate the science-public boundary is of
theoretical relevance as public expert role identities differ as to how the
position of epistemic authority in public life is constructed and negotiated, as
Article IV conveys. In regard to this, it is also made explicit in Article IV that
while science-based experts, who are more oriented to openly engage with the
public, display a move away from the position of distant epistemic authorities
in public life, they still actively construct and negotiate their public authority
despite the dialogical, egalitarian orientation to public communication as
such.
Credibility strategies and the constructed nature of public credibility
The relational nature of achieving, or failing to achieve, public authority and
credibility is also especially salient in studies within STS that reflexively deal
with the expert-lay interface (e.g. Wynne, 1992; 1996; Epstein, 1995; 1996).
These empirical studies have problematised any simple, categorical expert-lay
division, and demonstrate how the recognition of expertise fundamentally has
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to do with whether knowledge and advice of the social actors claiming
expertise is found credible and authoritative by those who should perceive
them as such. Moreover, these studies make the important notion that, at the
practical level, this crucially depends on culturally competent communication
that taps into the lifeworld and understanding of the clientele of expertise. For
example, one of the central points made by Wynne (1992; 1996) in his studies
on the interaction between UK government scientists and Cumbrian sheep
farmers after the Chernobyl fallout is how the scientists failed in exactly this
as they did not acknowledge the relevance of the sheep farmers’ local
knowledge for understanding the effects of the fallout in the specific
environment of Cumbria. They rather authoritatively imposed expert advice,
some of which later turned out to be considerably erroneous, that they
expected the farmers to follow. As a result, the scientists lost their credibility
as experts in relation to the farmers. Epstein’s (1995; 1996) studies of AIDS
activists also centrally make the same theoretical observation but, in turn,
show how the activists did manage to construct themselves as credible in
relation to biomedical culture and scientists, and also more broadly in
discussion about AIDS research in society and public life, through the
credibility tactic of communicating their knowledge in a way that tapped into
the discourse and culture of biomedicine, and also through the tactics of:
establishing themselves as political representatives, combining
epistemological and moral arguments, and taking sides in pre-existing
methodology debates about clinical research.
Conceptually key is the notion of the social actors’ different ways to aim to
establish credibility through practical and argumentative activities as
credibility tactics (Epstein, 1995), or strategies (Penders, 2014; Article II in
this thesis),3 which crucially are “key mechanisms” (Epstein, 1995: 410) in
constructing credibility (see also Shapin, 1995a: 261), and therefore need be
analysed and made explicit to better understand how credibility is established
by social actors for their knowledge and testimony to be taken as authoritative
in society and in public life. What kind of strategies get devised and utilised
has to do with for whom social actors want themselves and their propositions
to appear as credible. Constructing credibility as a knowledgeable, competent
social actor in relation to biomedical culture necessitates some rather specific
and different moves than those used for establishing credibility primarily in
relation to the lay public. Getting recognised as a public authority on healthy
eating is saliently a matter for which basically all social actors, also nutrition
scientists and professionals, need to engage in active credibility work because
healthy eating is an issue of relevance in everyday life over which a wide variety
of actors claim expertise. It is also an area where “the laity assert their freedom
to pick and choose which expertise is credible, while giving few signs that they
find the whole domain of dietary expertise wanting.” (Shapin, 2007a: 176).
Healthy eating as a public issue is therefore a fruitful site for investigating
3 As some more specific argumentative and rhetorical manoeuvres can also be involved.
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social actors’ strategies for establishing public credibility as providers of
authoritative advice for laypeople (Shapin, 2007a; Penders, 2014).4
Shapin (2007a) observes two key differences in how nutrition scientists
and best-selling popular diet authors (such as Dr. Atkins and Dr. Agatston)
address lay readers, and aim to establish their claims and themselves credible
and authoritative. First, the popular diet authors make efforts to engage with
the emotional and social meanings of eating, while nutrition scientists’
popular writing tends to address readers rather as something like rational
maximisers who only look for advice on how to make the right eating choices
to maximise health and to live longer. Second, nutrition scientists’ advice is
rather crafted for a population and its members, whereas popular authors
saliently address their readers as unique individuals and provide descriptions
of how other individuals have overcome dietary predicaments. Penders (2014)
observes how, in their popular books, three prominent Dutch nutrition
scientists aim to establish public credibility by drawing to a large extent on
some of the central credibility strategies and techniques of popular diet
authors, such as making use of narratives, by explicating norms and by
providing concrete lifestyle counsel, although their aim is rather to debunk
dietary “myths” and “diet gurus” and to replace them with nutritional facts.
However, Penders also observes that, although by drawing on such credibility
strategies of popular diet authors these scientists move beyond mere one-way
dissemination of nutritional knowledge and actively aim to establish a close
relationship with the lay reader, they still remain as rather distant scientists as
they merely pick these strategies from the toolbox of popular diet authors, but
“continue to be scientists, assuming that their readers share a very specific
world view in which in all things nutritional, science has a preferred access to
reality” (Penders, 2014: 908?909). This importantly makes explicit how
public credibility cannot be simply achieved by adopting the communicative
strategies and tricks of other social actors claiming expertise. As Article II in
this dissertation further points out and demonstrates, the epistemic stance,
that is, what is constructed as epistemically valuable and commonsensical in
the argumentation of social actors, importantly has to do with constructing
public credibility, and not just how the actors claiming expertise argue and
rhetorically persuade the lay public to accept their claims, and themselves, as
authoritative.
Important in establishing public credibility are also the specific rhetorical
resources, which are culturally bounded and available resources that can be
4 Of course, credibility strategies are not universal, or necessarily transferable between different
contexts, that is, that there would be something like the credibility strategies that can be discovered and
applied (Shapin, 1995a) in a business consulting kind of way. Also, credibility strategies are not
necessarily strictly hyper-contextual, so that for example the kinds of strategies identified by Epstein
would apply solely and be completely situated in the highly specific context that he studied, although
some specific manoeuvres and resources drawn upon within the strategies would be more context
specific. Conceivably, for example, strategies for establishing public credibility identified within the
dietary context could also be similar within other health contexts, and perhaps also more broadly when
it comes to social actors’ attempts to act as public authorities and to provide authoritative public advice
on matters relevant to everyday life.
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put to use to guide people to perceive and recognise arguments and claims as
authoritative, but can also be employed differently by social actors (Billig,
1996; Potter, 1996; also Shapin & Barnes, 1976). In investigating the relational
construction of public credibility, paying detailed attention to how specific
rhetorical resources are employed is arguably important as, for example,
responsibility or quantification can be rhetorically employed in argumentation
in very different ways by social actors claiming and struggling for public
authority, as Article II makes explicit. Moreover, in Article II, Michael Billig’s
(1991; 1996) notion of the dialectical nature of argumentation is drawn upon
to illuminate how public expertise is also relationally constructed in that social
actors construct public credibility dialectically by arguing against opposing
claims about the public issue at hand, and against opposing claims to
expertise.
Interactive framing and expert authority
Public engagement with science activities is an area of public life where the
issue of interaction between experts and the public is salient, but which also
involve elements of organised interaction (arrangements of sites of
interaction, possibly invited speakers, etc.) and typically facilitators who
mediate between the participants. Moreover, the intended aim is commonly to
avoid the formation of hierarchical, authoritative roles or positions between
participants and rather to keep the discussion participatory and deliberative
so that categorical “expert” positions based on technical competence or
credentials can be avoided. However, in practice, it is by recourse to science
and technical understanding that authority and propositional rights are often
also claimed by participants other than the invited expert speakers (Kerr et al.,
2007; Davies, 2013) and expert participants, such as scientists, can also easily
fall back on their technical expertise and answer related questions (Radstake
et al., 2009), thus maintaining a detached but authoritative position in the
discussions.
It has, however, also been observed that the dynamics of expertise and
hierarchies of authority are negotiated in the interaction between the
participants and facilitators by flexibly adopting different subject positions in
the expert-lay axis, as Kerr et al. (2007) observe. There can also be more
disruptive actions that break or resist such interactional arrangements and
“rules” of engagement that build up a hierarchy among expert speakers and
other participants (e.g. Davies, 2013). Article I draws on Erving Goffman’s
(1974) notion of interactive frames and framing to analyse how the relation of
authority and the propositional rights of participants also notably have to do
with different frames that can coexist in PES events. The Goffmanian notion
of interactive frames posits that frames constitute the organisation of
experience and what is going on in social interaction (Goffman, 1974; Tannen
& Wallat, 1987). The notion of interactive frames is a useful tool as it helps to
draw attention to the dynamics between more hierarchical and egalitarian
framings of relations between the participants, and how shifts in interactive
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framing can also be a way to negotiate the relation of authority between the
social actors involved.
Journalists’ role as mediators and interpreters of expertise
Much of STS research that touches upon experts and expertise in the public
sphere has tended to approach and conceptualise the expert-public relation as
somewhat direct. Although the issue of a categorical division between
“experts” and “the public” has certainly been discussed reflexively and in-
depth, the role and influence of the agents who mediate expertise in the public
sphere has been considerably less theorised within STS. While it is important
to understand the terms and ways in which experts aim to communicate and
establish a relation to the public, and vice versa, and while there are indeed
better than ever possibilities for direct expert-public communication via the
internet and social media, expertise in the contemporary public sphere is
arguably also socially shaped as it becomes mediated for the public. As
elaborated above, public engagement with science activities and events are one
area of public life in which mediation and interactional organisation of the
expert-public relation are involved, and which has gathered STS interest.
However, of relevance to better understand how expertise is socially shaped as
it is mediated is also to scrutinise how journalists judge and make use of
expertise, an issue that is chronically under-researched, especially within STS
scholarship. In addition to being central professionals mediating the expert-
public relationship, journalists also mediate between different social actors
claiming expertise in the public sphere.
By taking an attentive glance at the daily news stream it is hard not to spot
how permeated contemporary media reporting is by expert commentary
(Turner, 2003 also on this). It is noteworthy that the same can be said for the
most mundane issues pertaining to everyday life, and often even especially for
such issues. Healthy eating, in particular, is a topic where expert sources are
constantly utilised by journalists and they need to consider what to make of
different claims to expertise. Therefore, Article III scrutinises how the
journalistic judgement of expertise is constituted around this issue.
Journalists as professionals certainly do rely on experts to provide knowledge
and contextual understanding, as well to enact journalists’ own interpretations
and narratives as knowledgeable (Conrad, 1999; Tanner, 2004; Boyce, 2006;
Albæk, 2011). Therefore, journalists have an interest in utilising
knowledgeable sources, especially sources who can assert their claims with
authority and who are regularly relied upon by journalists (Gans, 1979; Hallin,
1986; Schudson, 2003; Reich, 2009). However, journalism is also essentially
a social institution with workings that are fundamentally guided by the active
and collective interpretative practice of the agents, the journalists (Zelizer,
1993). Therefore, journalism does not merely make passive use of expertise,
but rather actively interprets and articulates its meaning and relevance
through discourse, as do other social institutions in which the active
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interpretative work of social actors is central, such as the courts of law (Lynch,
2014).
Whereas the normative theory of expertise can rather be utilised to
scrutinise journalists’ assessment of their sources’ expertise in light of the
theoretical categories of technical expert ability (Boyce, 2006), to understand
in journalists’ own terms how they judge and utilise expertise, it is crucial to
get an analytical grasp of journalists’ shared discourse and interpretations on
this. For this purpose, the notion of interpretative repertoire, the culturally
shared ways of sensemaking within an interpretive community (Gilbert &
Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), is methodologically utilised to elicit
the different ways in which journalists account for their judgement of
expertise, and Article III shows how expertise is interpreted and constructed
within the different repertoires identified. The notion was originally developed
by the sociologists of science Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay (1984) to make
explicit how scientists variably draw in their discourse on an empiricists
repertoire (where science is empirical and rational) and on a contingent
repertoire (where science is fallible and involves social factors),5 and also to
point out how variability in social actors’ accounts can be approached as
analytically interesting, rather than as problematic, as analysing such
variability can also help to uncover contradictions and tensions between
repertoires. Article III does this in regard to repertoires drawn upon by
journalists to account for their judgement of dietetic expertise. This makes
intelligible how for journalists, as central mediators who exert influence on the
public recognition and understanding of expertise, different considerations
are related in how they judge and utilise expertise.
2.4 SSK METHODOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AND THE
STUDY OF PUBLIC EXPERTISE
In this section, I elaborate on how SSK methodological relativism
underpins the way in which the constructedness of expertise in the
contemporary public sphere is approached in this dissertation. This is
important in clarifying that approaching and analysing expertise in public life
from a relational perspective does not mean denying the possibility of social
actors possessing real expertise in the form of technical competence, or that
expertise should be understood as a mere linguistic construct as such.
Regarding this, this study concurs with Wynne’s view in his commentary on
Collins and Evans’ (2002) normative theory of expertise that “of course we can
agree that expertise is real, but its salience, validity and authority with respect
to a public issue are still conditional: these conditions can be elicited with SSK
5 The study is situated in a context of a scientific controversy and debate between biochemical
scientists working on oxidative phosphorylation. Gilbert and Mulkay demonstrate how the scientists
especially draw on the empiricist repertoire to account for their own views, whereas the contingent
repertoire was typically drawn upon to account for the views of scientists who held opposing views in the
controversy.
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‘methodological relativism’” (Wynne 2003, 403). Moreover, it is also
noteworthy that SSK methodological relativism directs to analytically
approach social actors’ claims to expertise in terms of being in need of
impartial and symmetrical social explanation, and to bracket considerations
regarding the erroneousness or truthfulness of the content of their statements.
In his 1976 book Knowledge and Social Imagery David Bloor, a scholar
from the Edinburgh school of science studies, explicated the epistemological-
methodological principles and laid the groundwork for the influential Strong
Programme, which basically argued for the possibility of sociological
investigation of scientific knowledge – alongside other types of knowledge –
and how this type of sociological analysis could proceed in a naturalistic, non-
normative fashion. As Bloor (1976: 2) puts it:
“The sociologist is concerned with knowledge, including scientific
knowledge, purely as a natural phenomenon. His definition of
knowledge will therefore be rather different from that of either the
layman or the philosopher. Instead of defining it as true belief,
knowledge for the sociologist is whatever men take to be knowledge. It
consists of those beliefs which men confidently hold to and live by.”
The Strong Programme, then, wanted to include scientific knowledge under
types of knowledge that can be analysed sociologically, so that the sociology of
knowledge would not have to be just the sociology of error. More importantly,
however, in Knowledge and Social Imagery, Bloor explicates the basic
methodological tenets of SSK:
“1 It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which
bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other
types of causes apart from social ones which will co-operate in
bringing about belief.
2 It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or
irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will
require explanation.
3 It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of
cause would explain, say, true and false beliefs.
4 It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would
have to be applicable to sociology itself. Like the requirement of
symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for general
explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because
otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own
theories.” (Bloor, 1976: 4?5.)
The basic point of symmetrical explanation in SSK methodological relativism
is, then, that “all beliefs are to be explained in the same way regardless of how
they are evaluated” (Bloor, 1976: 142). Methodological relativism was also a
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key stance adopted and developed by Harry Collins, in his earlier SSK work
under his so-called empirical programme of relativism (EPOR), and is
summarised by Collins (2001: 184) as “an attitude of mind recommended to
the social-scientist investigator: the sociologist or historian should act as
though the beliefs about reality of any competing groups being investigated
are not caused by the reality itself.” Thus, Collins emphasises, methodological
relativism is very distinct from philosophical relativism as “methodological
relativism is a technical matter” (Collins, 2001: 187).
The main purpose to purchase to SSK methodological relativism in
investigating the constructedness of expertise in the public sphere is, then,
that it gives a useful starting point for a symmetrical social explanation of the
studied social actors’ stances, views and practices. In Article II, for example,
the credibility work of the popular bloggers and institutional experts was
analysed in symmetrical terms and considerations regarding the
erroneousness or truthfulness of the contents of any social actors’ statements
were bracketed. Similarly, in Article III, it was analytically possible to elicit the
journalists’ shared discourse and various interpretative repertoires concerning
the journalistic judgement of dietary expertise because the journalists’ views
about what constitutes their judgement and considerations were not weighed
or discarded based on any presupposed idea of what might be a valid or
rational consideration by journalists when it comes to considering expert
sources and judging their expertise.
There is also a very practical point to methodological relativism in general
that is especially familiar to anthropologists doing fieldwork because it is a
practice “with the greatest professional self-interest. Fieldwork would be
impossible to accomplish if anthropologists felt free to voice dismay whenever
confronted by practices that struck them as illogical or repugnant.” (Brown,
2008: 367). Similarly as in anthropology, SSK methodological relativism, as a
research attitude, enables the analyst to be sensitive to treating all kinds of
views and claims to expertise respectfully, and with genuine sociological
interest in the studied social actors’ views and the origins of these views.
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3 RESEARCH MATERIALS AND
ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES
This chapter gives a description of the empirical research materials of this
dissertation, which were analysed with the help of the analytical tools
elaborated in the previous chapter. Overall, the research materials basically
consist of different types of text and talk from a variety of social actors.
However, these materials were not used in this dissertation just to talk about
talking and write about writing (Halfpenny, 1988), but were subject to
interpretation, which is necessary in order to say something about social and
cultural aspects through the analysis of the texts and talk of social actors
(Collins, 1983; Shapin, 1984; Fuhrman & Oehler, 1986; Halfpenny, 1988). The
use of text and talk data in this dissertation stems from the notion that
expertise in public life was not approached an observable “thing” or merely a
descriptive matter. Therefore, analysing social actors’ talk and writing is
important in grasping how expertise becomes relationally constructed,
defined and negotiated in social life. Moreover, to gather data concerning
sensemaking, boundary-work, identity construction, interactive framing, and
credibility strategies, for example only conducting standardised quantitative
surveys, or observing the daily, situated actions of people, would be
insufficient. This is because social actors’ active use of language needs to be
analysed in order to access and investigate such processes, which are relational
and have causative effects with respect to social life. Therefore, text and talk
data gained by doing interviews, or by gathering and analysing pieces of
written discourse, are especially useful (Lamont & Swidler, 2014; Orbuch,
1997; Miller & Glassner, 1997).
The research materials do not consist of text and talk of just one group of
social actors concerning one, specific domain in the contemporary public
sphere, such as research interviews only with scientists during which they
would be asked to talk about public expertise in social media specifically.
Rather, the research materials consist of text and talk from a variety of social
actors: (1) who primarily write and speak from an expert subject position
(scientists, professional practitioners, popular blog authors), (2) who mediate
expertise for audiences (journalists, public engagement with science event
facilitators), and (3) members of an audience at a  public engagement with
science event (who also actively negotiate expertise). All of these groups of
social actors can be considered to have a role in the social shaping of expertise
in the contemporary public sphere. Furthermore, the materials also touch
upon a variety of public arenas, such as editorial media (journalism), the
blogosphere, and PES events. Such different arenas can be considered to be
central sites in which expertise gets constructed and negotiated in public life,
26
but also involve different communicative logic and afford different relational
dynamics.
The next subsections provide a description of the sets of empirical research
materials that constitute the data of the four original articles. In addition to
describing the kinds of data collected and analysed, the next subsections give
a concise overview of the procedures and rationales of data collection and
analysis in the articles.
3.1 MATERIALS COLLECTED FROM A PUBLIC
ENGAGEMENT WITH SCIENCE EVENT
The materials of Article I, co-authored with Esa Väliverronen, consisted of
observational materials and a questionnaire gathered during a PES event at
the 2011 Science Forum (Tieteen päivät) in Helsinki where four panellists
discussed climate change with the audience. Three of the panellists were
experts in climate change issues: a researcher from the Finnish Meteorological
Institute, a researcher from the Finnish Environment Institute and a
representative from the Demos Helsinki think tank. There was also one non-
expert panellist, a girl from an upper secondary school. The panel was held in
the cafeteria of the main building at the University of Helsinki and lasted about
an hour and a half. There were also two hosts present at the café, an online
host and a face-to-face host. Young people were the target audience for the
event. An Internet Relay Chat (IRC) with two moderators was also integrated
into the event. This multimodality of interaction — the combination of face-
to-face and virtual discussion within one event — also enabled the analysis in
Article I of how different modes of interaction relate to each other, and how
communication and social relations differed between the various modes of
interaction.
The data for Article I were collected in two types of ways: through
observation and by using a questionnaire. The methods of observation
included direct observation of the event – based on which a field report was
written and analysed – and observing both the video tape of the event and the
internet chat after the event had concluded, which were also
transcribed/collated for the analysis. We, the authors of Article I, had no
participatory role in the actual event, and we were also not involved in
planning or organising the event. The purpose of the questionnaire was to
provide background information about the panellists and the audience, as well
as their opinions regarding the event and PES activities in general. The
questionnaire form had questions and statements about communication,
engagement and learning during the event. The questionnaire data was,
however, used in Article I only as background material, as the focus was on
qualitative analysis. The analysis focused on the interactive framings and their
negotiation in such a setting that ideally aimed at egalitarian, non-hierarchical
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public discourse between the expert panellists and the lay public. The analysis
in Article I first explored the staging of the event, that is, the setting of the
physical location, as well as other crucial material and organisational
arrangements. After this, the interactive frames employed in the event were
analysed in terms of how they related to each other and consideration was
given to what this means in terms of the social interaction and negotiation of
relations between the actors involved: the expert panellists, the non-expert
panellist, the audience members (both at the café and online), and the
facilitators as mediators.
3.2 BLOG POSTS OF POPULAR NUTRITION
COUNSELLING BLOGGERS AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS
The materials for Article II, co-authored with Janne Huovila, consisted of blog
posts by six Finnish popular nutrition counselling bloggers (PNC bloggers)
and by two academic experts contributing to the National Institute for Health
and Welfare’s blog (NIHW bloggers). Cision’s top 10 health blogs in Finland
list from March 2011 (Cision, 2011), together with a broad reading of the
Finnish dietetic blogosphere, was used to identify the six PNC bloggers. Most
of these six bloggers have appeared in Finnish media, and five of them
mentioned that they had published one or more books after beginning to write
their blog. All of these bloggers aimed to provide dietetic advice and concepts,
such as how much and what kind of nutrients and foods one should eat and
why, and how one should overall think about food and eating in order to stay
healthy. However, none of these bloggers mentioned having a university
degree in nutrition or medicine, or working in health care organisations, but
rather defined themselves as nutrition professionals who have some
education. Five blog posts by each of these six bloggers (altogether 30 posts),
that exemplified all of these authors’ particularistic and individualistic stance
in giving authoritative advice on healthy eating, were chosen for detailed
analysis out of all of these bloggers’ posts (n = 169) from the period from the
beginning of October 2012 up to the end of October 2013. The PNC bloggers’
approach to providing dietary advice was compared to that of two academic
experts who had written about healthy eating in the NIHW blog: a senior
nutrition researcher, Marja-Leena Ovaskainen, and the Head of the Health
Department, Dr Erkki Vartiainen. All seven blog entries related to healthy
eating written by Ovaskainen and Vartiainen, from 2012 up to November
201,4 were chosen for analysis. Altogether, then, the material chosen for
analysis in Article II consisted of 37 blog posts by the PNC and NIHW bloggers.
The posts were analysed with a focus on how these authors aimed to
establish public credibility for their claims and themselves, a practice which
increasingly takes places in the blogosphere that lacks many of the social
controls that govern the conduct of professional journalists and experts
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(Turner, 2013). The analysis in Article II proceeded by first focusing on
identifying explicit normative advice and claims about healthy eating in the
posts, after which we analysed what kind of expressions and rhetoric were used
to justify the advice given and the claims made. Attention was also paid in the
analysis to justifications of claims through criticism of competing claims. A
specific focus was on what kind of rhetorical resources (Billig, 1996; Potter,
1996) the bloggers drew upon and how they appropriated these in different
ways in establishing dietetic credibility. As the bloggers’ texts were approached
as argumentative accounts (Billig, 1996) in an ongoing public dispute about
healthy eating, central to the analysis was the examination of the wider
rhetorical strategies used by the authors. In analysing these, the focus was on
how different rhetorical resources were strategically utilised by the authors to
establish a certain viewpoint on healthy eating as being credible and to counter
alternative views. Based on these analytical grounds, three dominant
rhetorical strategies used by the PNC bloggers were identified in the analysis
of Article II: (1) appealing to personal experience, (2) indicating cultural
struggle, and (3) redefining authority. The NIHW bloggers’ posts were
subsequently analysed to investigate how their credibility construction
compares to that of the PNC bloggers and to the three strategies.
3.3 IN-DEPTH QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS WITH
JOURNALISTS AND EXPERTS
The third set of research materials in this dissertation come from a broad
qualitative interview study dealing with public dietary expertise in Finland
that I conducted. This set of research materials consists in total of 26
qualitative, in-depth interviews with both journalists and experts. Article III
deals with journalist interviews and Article IV with the expert interviews, so I
describe these separately.
The materials for Article III consisted of ten in-depth, qualitative
interviews with Finnish journalists reporting about health issues and about
healthy eating for the news media. I did these interviews between June and
December 2014. Each interview session lasted from 45 to 105 minutes
approximately and was recorded. For the analysis, the recorded material was
transcribed to text documents. The interviewed journalists’ work experience
in journalism varied from a couple of years to decades with an average
experience of 14.25 years of reporting. The broad issues dealt with in the
interviews were: (1) selection of expert sources when covering healthy eating
topics, (2) judgement of the sources’ expertise and (3) the role of the media in
constructing an understanding of healthy eating and the expertise related to
it. The guiding idea in the interviews was to encourage the interviewees to
reflect about their actions, considerations and choices in dealing with expert
sources for healthy eating topics, as well as to discuss more generally how
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journalism relates to expertise in this context. The analysis in Article III
focused on the different but “relatively internally consistent” (Wetherell and
Potter, 1988: 171) ways in which these journalists talked about journalism and
dietetic expertise, based on which four interpretative repertoires were
identified ? routine, pluralistic, service and interest ? in each of which the
issue of journalistic judgement of dietetic expertise was constructed in
different terms. Each of these repertoires involved the use of expressions,
terms and style (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to discuss
dietetic expertise specific to that repertoire, which were attended to in
analysing and classifying the statements of the journalists.
The materials for Article IV consisted of a set of sixteen in-depth,
qualitative interviews with scientists and different types of practitioners. In
order to investigate these experts’ views on public expertise in healthy eating,
sixteen individuals were interviewed who all had several years’ experience of
addressing people about healthy eating from an expert subject position in the
public domain. Eight of these were academic researchers – six nutrition and
food scientists, and two social scientists who perform nutrition and food
related social scientific research. Eight of these actors could be labelled as
“field experts” (Setälä & Väliverronen, 2014) who work in the field with
laypeople as experts; in this case giving people practical advice concerning
healthy eating. The field experts were not chosen to represent a certain
occupational group, but on the grounds that they have experience in acting as
public experts in matters related to healthy eating, and addressing people from
such a subject position. Five of these field experts had an educational
background in nutrition and food sciences, and worked as dietitians or as
nutritionists. In addition, one medical doctor, one health coach and one
personal trainer were interviewed. However, regarding the academic
researchers’ accounts, the analysis focused on the accounts of the nutrition
and food scientists. In the case of the field experts, the focus was on the
accounts of the dietitians and nutritionists. This choice was purposefully made
to focus on the public expert role identities of scientists and scientifically
trained professionals with academic linkage of some sort to nutrition and food
sciences specifically. It is noteworthy that both groups also speak in public
from a position of established, credentialed experts and that they are centrally
relied upon for science-based dietary advice when acting as public experts,
although they differ as occupational expert groups.
The interviews were conducted between June 2014 and February 2015. The
interviews lasted between 60 to 120 minutes, and were recorded and
transcribed to text documents for analysis. These were semi-structured, in-
depth interviews in which the interviewees were asked about their experiences
of acting as public experts, and about their views of knowledge and expertise
more generally in the context of healthy eating as a public issue. The guiding
idea was to get the experts to reflect about their own role as public experts, to
discuss their stance towards other actors who address the public from an
expert subject position, and to reflect about the role of experts more generally
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in public discussions about healthy eating. The interviewees’ responses were
approached as accounts (Scott & Lyman, 1968), and therefore the views and
definitions given by the interviewees were considered, not simply as
descriptions of the specific public expert role identities of the individual
experts interviewed but in terms of performative social action in which
different types of public expert role identities are accounted for and are
enacted. In analysing the interviewees’ responses, the contingency of
boundary drawing (Gieryn, 1999) ? that is, that the actors’ attribution of
characteristics to their own practices and competences can vary and be flexible
? was taken as an important heuristic notion. In the analysis, specific focus
was on how the interviewees’ carve role identities through boundary-work
(Lam, 2010) as they navigate the science-public boundary. Based on this, three
public expert role identities were identified: objectivity-oriented, explanation-
oriented and engaged expert.
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4 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
In this chapter, I provide a summary of the findings of the four original articles
that comprise this dissertation. All of these articles, for their part, tackle the
research question presented in the Introduction: how expertise is constructed,
negotiated and judged, and in what ways this relates to the expansion of
expertise, in the contemporary public sphere. All of these articles are
theoretically grounded in the relational approach in the social study of
expertise (see section 2.3. and its subsections), and the findings of the articles
further contribute to this literature by making explicit ways in which public
expertise is relationally shaped from different perspectives. To be clear, this
chapter focuses mainly on presenting each of the original studies’ empirical
findings and key insights in a concise manner so that these can be grasped
clearly, whereas the discussion and the conclusion chapter move on to discuss
the results of these articles on a more abstract, theoretical plane. Furthermore,
the complete analyses are to be found in the original articles.
4.1 ARTICLE I: INTERACTIVE FRAMINGS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF EXPERT-LAY INTERACTION IN A
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT WITH SCIENCE EVENT
Article I provides an insight into how expert-lay interaction is constructed and
how the relation of authority is negotiated at the level of interaction (order)
between the expert speakers, lay participants, event facilitators and
moderators. The analysis focuses on the interactive framings at an informal
PES event about climate change aimed at young (lay) people that was held
during the 2011 Science Forum (Tieteen Päivät) in Finland.
As a central finding, Article I identifies four ideal-typical interactive frames
within the event: theatre, education, participation and play. The theatrical
frame had much to with the organisation and staging of the event with the
invited panellists seated behind a desk speaking through a microphone. The
lay audience did not have access to microphones. This resulted in rather
monologic performances by expert speakers to the audience that upheld an
interactional expert-lay divide and a role for the lay audience to participate
primarily indirectly by reacting to what was said on the stage. In the education
frame, expert knowledge was authoritatively communicated to the lay
audience who were considered to be in need of more or of a new kind of expert
knowledge, or who indicated that they wanted to learn more about the issue
discussed at a given moment during the interaction. In the participatory
frame, egalitarian discussion about the topic at hand ? implications of climate
change in everyday life ? was encouraged between all the participants. This
functioned in the event as a normative meta-frame of interaction as rational
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civic discussion. However, this also led the facilitators to sanitise audience
efforts to take part in the discussion when their comments were not considered
to fit as part of rational, civic deliberation. In contrast to the other interactive
frames, the play frame was rather evoked by some of the lay participants in the
online chat of the event by contributing playful and confrontational
commentaries to a discussion on their own terms, and not just conforming and
reacting to the expert-led discourse of the event. This was a way to negotiate
the dominant structure of interaction favouring expert speakers and to resist
the control imposed by facilitators over commentary that did not fit the civic
mode of the discussion.
Through the identification of these multiple interactive frames within the
event, Article I shows that although PES events commonly aim to expand and
“democratise” expertise, and to avoid attributing epistemic authority only to
invited expert speakers, at the interactional level, some framings (theatre,
education) can still involve a more hierarchical interaction order, which
mainly maintains the epistemic authority of the expert speakers. Moreover,
the article highlights that while the participatory interactive framing entails a
normative ideal of egalitarian discussion and aims to overcome the expert-lay
dichotomy, the interactional mode of rational discourse and civic deliberation
in this framing rather contributes to maintaining an epistemic hierarchy as
(lay) commentary unfit for this interactional mode is easily sanitised. The
identification of the play frame in Article I makes especially explicit how this
way of challenging and shifting the mode of interaction by participants in PES
events works as a way of negotiating expert-lay dynamics and epistemic
authority at this type of event.
4.2 ARTICLE II: EXPERTISE AND CREDIBILITY
CONSTRUCTION IN THE DIETETIC BLOGOSPHERE
Article II demonstrates how six highly popular nutrition counselling (PNC)
bloggers establish credibility for their claims and public authority for
themselves as they advocate a more individualistic understanding of healthy
eating. The article also shows how the rhetorical resources they draw upon
differ and contrast with those of two experts who contribute to the blog of the
National Institute for Health and Welfare (NIHW). Therefore the article
crucially makes explicit the relational dynamics and dialectical construction of
dietary understanding and authority in the Finnish dietetic blogosphere.
The central finding of Article II is the identification of three strategies of
credibility construction by the PNC bloggers, and the rhetorical resources
drawn upon within these strategies, as well as how the NIHW bloggers
credibility construction compares and relates to these. The first strategy was
that of appealing to personal experience in which personal dietary experiences
were constructed as epistemically valuable. In this strategy, the PNC bloggers
drew upon the rhetorical resource of the humble servant to position
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themselves as individuals who aim to discuss mundane dietary problems with
other individuals and aim to solve these together with their readers. However,
the PNC bloggers utilised their personal experiences in an exemplary way to
construct dietary advice based on their experience authoritative for the
readers. This was done especially by utilising the rhetorical resource of
narratives of rebirth to convey how the PNC bloggers had themselves made
mistakes in their eating practices, but, importantly, also learned important
lessons about healthy eating and the body based on making such mistakes and
having experienced problems. The NIHW bloggers also referred to personal
experiences in their writing, but these were decoupled from knowledge claims
made about healthy eating. By contrast, for the PNC bloggers, appealing to
personal experiences was crucially epistemic. They were communicated as
exemplars that convey and construct dietary knowledge, and show the
bloggers as knowledgeable on healthy eating based on personal experience and
growth.
The second strategy was to indicate a cultural struggle, which figured
prominently both in the PNC bloggers’ and NIHW bloggers’ argumentation.
For the PNC bloggers, indicating cultural struggles functioned as a way to
support their argumentation and to enhance their public authority by
positioning themselves in relation to traditional health promotion institutions
as freedom fighters for dietetic individualism. Central to this relational
argumentation was an appeal to common sense as a rhetorical resource. The
PNC bloggers displayed their views and claims in terms of dietary common
sense and thereby relevant for consideration in daily life, whereas opposing
population-based understanding of healthy eating was implied to be abstract
and alienated from mundane individual concerns, and thus it is better to rely
on the kind of dietary common sense advocated than on traditional nutritional
expertise. The PNC bloggers also utilised cultural narratives that introduced
actors and ideas alternative to traditional nutritional authorities and
understanding to the stage of cultural narratives about healthy eating, for
example, by contrasting dietary common sense in French food culture with the
nutritional understanding of registered dietitians. This also worked as a way
of downplaying traditional nutritional expertise as abstract and opposed to
dietary commonsense in food cultures, and to show the PNC blogger, by
contrast, as a provider of public dietary advice acknowledging the value of such
commonsense in considering healthy eating. In their argumentation, the
NIHW bloggers also made reference to cultural struggles over healthy eating
and maintained their authority by conveying such struggles as highly
problematic. By drawing upon civic responsibility as a rhetorical resource, the
NIHW bloggers appealed to the readers as health-conscious citizens who
should see through opposing dietary claims in public debates over healthy
eating and who realise the benefits of adhering to the advice provided in
nutrition recommendations by traditional nutritional experts, such as
themselves.
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The third strategy was to redefine authority by which the PNC bloggers
appropriated science and quantification as rhetorical resources to evoke the
authority of science in constructing credibility for their individual-oriented
argumentation and advice. Whereas the NIHW bloggers drew upon science
and quantification as resources to support population-level claims concerning
healthy eating, the PNC bloggers rather attributed authority to single scholars
and studies that provided support to challenge population-level
recommendations and nutrition institutions as authorities and for more
particularistic arguments. The PNC bloggers also appropriated scientific terms
and language in credibility construction to convincingly present advice
concerning dietary changes and personal health. The authoritativeness of
quantitative information was also linked by the PNC bloggers to information
gained through personal health measurement devices and tests, which these
bloggers portrayed as valuable in how they have used, and their readers can
use, quantitative information to consider their individual diets. Such
quantitative information was also often represented in critical relation to the
authoritativeness of population-level nutrition advice (e.g. concerning
recommended intakes) based on national nutrition recommendations.
Article II thus demonstrates how popular nutrition counselling bloggers, as
social actors who are not traditional scientific experts, construct credibility for
a more individualistic understanding of healthy eating and simultaneously
construct public authority for themselves as authoritative figures who can
provide advice for their readers based on such an understanding. The findings
of the article make especially explicit how the PNC bloggers’ credibility
construction strategies crucially work in a dialectical relation to universalistic,
population-based understanding, as well as how the NIHW bloggers
argumentation and credibility construction, as institutional nutrition
authorities, work and compare to the PNC bloggers’ identified strategies.
Article II notably highlights how, for the PNC bloggers, dietetic individualism
is an encompassing epistemic stance in which personal experiences and other
practical and particular knowledge are valued alongside scientific knowledge.
Regarding this, it is also emphasised in the article how the PNC bloggers’
individual-oriented communicative approach and tactics are thereby in line
with this epistemic stance in their credibility construction, whereas when the
NIHW bloggers made references to personal experiences, these were
decoupled from epistemic issues concerning healthy eating.
4.3 ARTICLE III: JOURNALISTIC JUDGEMENT AND THE
SOCIAL SHAPING OF EXPERTISE – FINNISH
JOURNALISTS’ ACCOUNTS ON JOURNALISTIC
JUDGEMENT OF DIETARY EXPERTISE
Article III scrutinises Finnish journalists’ accounts on how they judge
expertise and use expert sources in the context of healthy eating, and thus
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come to socially shape dietary expertise, and its public recognition and
understanding, in the contemporary public sphere.
In Article III, four different interpretative repertoires are identified, in
which each journalistic judgement of expertise in the context of healthy eating
is accounted for, and constructed, in different terms by the interviewed
journalists. The routine repertoire conveyed a distancing stance in which the
journalists attributed the judgement of expertise and expert source selection
to sourcing routines and story construction conventions in crafting health
news. Such routine journalistic work practices set out to prioritise nutrition
scientists and credentialed nutrition professionals as types of official expert
sources and to differentiate between lay and expert sources. However, on
closer inspection, the journalists’ descriptions and rhetoric, for example
concerning differentiating between expert knowledge and lay experience of
health, in this repertoire were indicative of how journalistic work routines do
not simply dictate such prioritising and ordering of sources, but rather how
deference to the cultural authority of science and biomedicine is inscribed into
the routines of healthy eating news coverage and sourcing. In the pluralistic
repertoire, the journalists accounted that, as healthy eating is a broad,
multifaceted issue that touches upon the practical and the mundane,
journalists commonly need to attend to other sources and ways of knowing
alongside nutrition scientists, such as the different types of practitioners who
work in the area of healthy eating who can often provide valuable advice based
on practical experience. Therefore, this repertoire conveyed how considering
and consulting different forms of dietary expertise and knowledge is not
generally thought of as problematic in journalism.
In the service repertoire, the journalistic judgement and use of expertise
was accounted for in a saliently commodified sense in how there is a need for
the journalists to consider how the consulted sources’ expertise serves, and can
be made relevant to, the specific concerns of active seekers of health
knowledge who aim to improve their dietary practices with the help of the
expert advice provided. The interest repertoire essentially conveyed how
interest considerations are involved as journalists choose expert sources and
consider their expertise. This repertoire allowed the journalists to emphasise
how all kinds of potential interests warrant journalistic attention when sources
are consulted for expert commentary and advice. The interviewed journalists
portrayed this as crucial because healthy eating is a topic permeated by
commercial interests, but also by governmental and institutional health
promotion interests, all of which journalists need to consider critically and
keep in check when considering sources’ claims to expertise and their
propositions as expert sources.
Through the identification of these four repertoires, Article III makes
explicit how expert source selection and consideration of the expertise of
sources by journalists exceeds the issue of recognising and considering the
sources’ technical expertise in reporting about healthy eating. Regarding this,
the article demonstrates how journalistic judgement of dietary expertise is
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influenced by routine deference to the cultural authority of science and
medicine in health reporting, and by considerations over expert sources’
interests, as well as how the expert sources’ advice addresses the concerns of
active seekers of health knowledge. Furthermore, Article III also highlights
how the identification of the different repertoires elucidates tensions in the
journalistic judgement of dietary expertise, and how such tensions can
influence how journalists come to consult sources as experts and socially shape
expertise in the public sphere. It is pointed out in the article how, for instance,
the interest repertoire identified convey the importance of critical journalistic
considerations over potential interests involved in sources’ claims to expertise
and in their advice. However, the article emphasises how in tension with this
is how journalistic consideration of dietary expertise from a service
perspective can effectively lead to eschewing such considerations and to rely
on sources who are able and willing to address popular diet concerns, as well
as to attribute responsibility for health outcomes from dietary advice provided
to the sources consulted as experts and for the readers who attend to the advice
provided. It is therefore posited in Article III that service considerations can
also expand the spectrum of expert sources and expertise consulted, because
whereas scientific experts, such as nutrition scientists, can easily question the
relevance of some popular dietary concerns, practitioners and other social
actors can be more willing to provide, and are accustomed to providing, advice
addressing these concerns.
4.4 ARTICLE IV: CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC EXPERT
ROLE IDENTITIES AND EXPERT AUTHORITY
Article IV illuminates scientists and scientifically trained professionals’
construction of role identities as public experts on healthy eating through
identity- and boundary-work by analysing their interview accounts. The
multiplicity of public expert role identities and the normative orientation of
these enacted role identities, which reflect different views of the role of experts
and expertise in society, are made explicit. The findings point to the centrality
of enacting and maintaining epistemic authority within the different public
expert role identities identified.
In Article IV, three public expert role identities are identified, and it is
elaborated how these are constructed based on an analysis of the interviewees’
accounts. The objectivity-oriented public expert role identity entailed
expressing an explicitly distanced, authoritative relation to the public as an
epistemic authority who passively disseminates expert advice grounded in
scientific evidence to the public. Central to the enactment of this role identity
was especially displaying an ethos of disinterestedness in which passively
providing research evidence or clinical guidelines, and neutrally evaluating
claims presented as an expert, for the public were emphasised when describing
oneself as a public expert and how experts should communicate in public. The
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appeal to disinterestedness in constructing this expert role identity was also
saliently relational in boundary-work in which a strict contrast was drawn
between political commentary, which was portrayed as subjective and
opinion-based, and providing evidence-based expert advice to the public,
which was portrayed as a non-subjective activity. Objectivity-orientedness was
further conveyed by emphasising a lack of interest in seeking publicity as such,
and rather being involved as an expert in commenting on healthy eating for
the media and in other public arenas out of a sense of duty and to fulfil the
external demands of public engagement. Characteristic in conveying this role
identity was also the view that public expertise is continuous with professional
expertise. What was described as important in acting as a public expert was
the ability to communicate substantial expertise that one has developed on
specific issues rather than any need to adapt to the requirements of the media
or the expectations of the public. It was also highlighted how it is better to
refrain from commenting on dietary issues falling outside the scope of one’s
substantial expertise, which highlights adherence to commenting based
strictly on substantial expert understanding by contrast to social actors who
do not acknowledge the limits of their expertise in this manner when
commenting on dietary issues in public. Epistemic authority to provide public
advice concerning healthy eating was thus anchored to disinterestedness,
professional competence and acknowledging the scope and limits of one’s
competence.
By contrast to the objectivity-oriented role identity, experts who conveyed
an explanation-oriented role identity expressed intrinsic motivation to act as
a public expert. Emphasis was put on how it is enjoyable and rewarding to
explain nutrition and diet related issues to the public, although an extrinsic
sense of social duty, such as having received public funding as a scientist, was
also expressed. An ethos of rationality – that is, a salient emphasis on
upholding scientific rationality as a public expert – was also central in enacting
this role identity. References to social and moral duty in conveying the
explanation-oriented role identity were notably also linked to mentions of how
public discussions about healthy eating are permeated by, what the experts
conveying this role identity perceive as, distorted knowledge and contending
expertise. Therefore, it was emphasised how, especially for this reason, it is
important to take part in public discussion and to be available for the media to
consult as an expert to counter these views. Such relational identity work
crucially functions to construct an expert role identity as an active agent whose
expert explanations ”balance” what they perceive as distorted knowledge
claims or unfounded claims to dietary expertise in public discussions.
Emphasis on exposing how one-sided special interests can be involved in some
claims to dietary expertise in the public sphere, as well as on debunking dietary
“myths” through corrective explaining as an expert, were also prominent in
conveying and enacting the explanation-oriented public expert role identity.
Although conveying this role identity involved expressing how it is not enough
to merely communicate substantial expert knowledge to the public when
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acting as public expert, epistemic authority and capacity to act as a public
expert was still anchored to mastery in the provision of science-based
explanation and commentary to the public.
The third public expert role identity, the engaged expert, was
characteristically constituted by an ethos of service, in which emphasis was
put on engaging with common, practical dietetic issues brought to public
discussion, and to providing people with practically useful expert advice to
help people to deal with such issues. Intrinsic motivation was also signalled
and coupled with the ethos of service, which involved expressing personal
dedication and passion to communicate about healthy eating with the public
to be of help as a public dietary expert. Narrative competence was also
centrally emphasised as an important ability in enacting the engaged expert
role identity, as narratives were portrayed as important in providing engaging
and relatable expert advice. Furthermore, emphasis on narrative competence
and the role of narratives in engaging with the public also importantly convey
an expert persona who does not aim to delete or distance oneself from the
expert advice provided, but rather who acknowledges the uses of the
storytelling format in expert communication and strives to act as a relatable
character whose advice the public can identify with. The engaged expert role
identity was also enacted in relation to a public expert role in which the aim is
merely to disinterestedly disseminate general advice grounded in research
evidence and guidelines, which was portrayed to fail to lead to successful
engagement with the public. Thus, the engaged expert role identity contrasted
with the objectivity-oriented public expert role identity identified and involved
relational identity work with respect to that kind of public expert role.
Moreover, experts who conveyed the engaged expert role identity also engaged
in relational boundary-work with respect to social actors who claim dietary
expertise based on personal experience in public. In this boundary-work,
emphasis was placed on one’s cumulated and scientifically informed expert
understanding, which social actors claiming expertise merely on grounds of
personal experience were indicated to lack, in addition to them being
portrayed as somewhat emotionally invested in their dietary experiences and
claims. The enactment of the engaged expert role thus involved double
boundary-work for purposes of identity construction and maintaining
epistemic authority in which different characteristics were attributed to the
engaged expert identity to demarcate it both from a distant, objectivity-
oriented public expert position and from the position of experiential expertise
grounded primarily in personal dietary experience.
Article IV highlights how different public expert role identities are
relationally carved as experts situate and consider their role with respect to the
public, and to other ways of acting as a public expert and having claims to
expertise. It also points out how public expert role identities that entail a move
away from the position of distant expert authorities in public – the
explanation-oriented and engaged expert role identities – also involve
upholding epistemic authority, despite the more public-oriented stance of
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acting as an expert in public. Furthermore, Article IV illuminates experts’
active negotiation and management of what is the experts’ role and how to act
as an expert in public discussions over such issues as healthy eating which have
relevance to everyday life, and where pressure is also exerted to established
experts to take part in the discussions with the public and to provide expert
advice.
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigated and provided insight to the constructedness and
expansion of expertise in the contemporary public sphere through empirical
inquiry. The four empirical articles approached this issue by focusing on the
different areas of public engagement with science events (Article I), the
blogosphere (Article II), journalism (Article III), and experts’ own views and
understanding of their role as public experts (Article IV). Having investigated
the issue from such different vantage points, theoretically relevant common
threads in the constructedness and expansion of expertise in the
contemporary public sphere can be usefully identified and illuminated based
on the results gained from the articles. This final chapter moves to discuss
these common threads on a more theoretical plane and in relation to the
literature presented in Chapter 2.
5.1 EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE IN THE
CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC SPHERE
One of the key aspects in Collins and Evans’ normative theory of expertise is
the focus on experience as a constitutive feature of expertise – due to which
they also often talk about their approach as “studies of expertise and
experience” (e.g. Collins & Evans, 2002; 2007). Collins and Evans’ emphasise
experience as constitutive of expertise in the sense of technical ability and
skills gained by social actors through experience within technical domains.
The results of this dissertation also indicate that the issue of experience is
crucially tied to expertise and its expansion in public arenas. However, based
on the results, it is argued here that key to how expertise is established, and to
how it is judged and negotiated in the contemporary public sphere, is how
experience and knowledge grounded in it are made and assessed to bear
practical relevance to the intended public and to daily life. This way of how
experience is drawn upon by social actors claiming expertise, and considered
by those mediating expertise and attending to expert advice, also contributes
to the expansion of expertise in the contemporary public sphere in terms of
the emergence of new types of social actors, such as popular bloggers, as public
authorities on science-related issues of everyday relevance (Article II).
Moreover, it also contributes to the use of such new and more various social
actors as experts in providing expert advice to the public (Article III).
As demonstrated in Article II, for example highly popular diet bloggers
construct their epistemic authority in relation to their readers by appealing
and attributing epistemic value to their personal experiences of what kind of
diet works in daily practice than by making reference to or by displaying
technical competence, or lack of thereof, in nutrition. They actively establish
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themselves as authoritative by appealing to and sharing their personal dietary
experiences, and the understanding they have gained through these, in an
exemplary fashion and as something epistemically valuable for their readers
to consider concerning their daily dietary practices and experiences. Article III
makes explicit that journalists also tend to consider and utilise sources who
can provide advice to readers concerning how to deal with actual dietary
predicaments in daily life based on practical experience as useful expert
sources on healthy eating alongside nutrition scientists who are commonly
prioritised as medically authoritative sources. Therefore, if journalists
consider sources to be able to provide practical advice on dietary issues based,
for example, on counselling or personal experience such sources can get
consulted for dietary advice regardless of whether they have expert credentials
or demonstrable medical authority.
The findings (Article IV) also theoretically complement previous relational
literature on the constructedness of public expert roles and identities
(Rijswoud, 2012; Rijswoud, 2014; also Davies & Horst, 2016) by highlighting
how situating and drawing connections to the public’s everyday experience
plays a role in the construction of public expert role identities of scientists and
scientifically trained professionals who are more typically considered and
consulted as epistemic authorities due to their scientific understanding and
competence. As elaborated in Article IV, science-based experts who embrace
an engaged expert role identity as public experts consider it important to be
able to provide tangible expert advice with respect to the everyday experiences
and concerns of public. Moreover, they also emphasise the importance of
doing this in such a way, for example in narrative form, that both the content
of the advice and the expert as a provider of the advice become relatable for
the public. This highlights that whereas science-based experts who embrace
an objectivity-oriented role identity as public experts conceive and construct
their role in terms of acting as distant epistemic authorities by placing
emphasis on passive dissemination of scientific evidence and guidelines,
engaged experts do not seek to distance themselves from, but to rather to
establish proximity to, the everyday experience of the public as a way of
striving for public relevance and authority. Supporting a notion by Bart
Penders (2014), Article IV similarly makes explicit that because engaged
experts crucially ground their public expert role identity on the need to engage
with the everyday experience and lifeworld of the public, they move on similar
ground to various popular authors and bloggers who also place emphasis on
the experiential. However, expanding on this notion, Article IV also
demonstrates notably how the engaged experts also actively construct their
role identity as public experts through protective boundary-work in relation to
these kinds of social actors’ who claim epistemic authority primarily by virtue
of experiential understanding.
Therefore, the findings of this dissertation also contribute to and
complement more general theoretical notions in previous relational literature
on the uses and role of experience in how expertise is constructed in public
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contexts (e.g. Wynne, 1992; 1996; Epstein 1995, 1996). The findings add to
theoretical notions concerning experience and expertise in this literature by
highlighting how making knowledge grounded in practical and personal
experience bear relevance to the everyday experience and considerations of
the intended public is central to how expertise is relationally constructed in
public. The findings testify to this relational aspect both in how the epistemic
authority of new and more varied types of social actors, as well as the engaged
expert role identity of established science-based experts as public experts, are
constructed.
5.2 INDIVIDUALISATION, CONSUMERISM AND PUBLIC
EXPERTISE
In addition to establishing relevance to the intended public’s everyday
experience and practices, the findings of this dissertation have also evidenced
two other important ways in which individualisation, and how this relates to
consumerism, relates to the constructedness and expansion of expertise in the
contemporary public sphere.
First, the findings show how both new types of social actors who actively
aim to establish themselves as authoritative in public, and established science-
based experts who embrace an engaged expert role identity as public experts,
centrally adhere to a more service-oriented ethos and approach as providers
of expert advice to the public (Article II, Article IV). A way of striving for and
constructing public authority, central to this service-orientation is not talking
down to the public, but striving to be of help as an expert and to provide advice
related to actual concerns of individuals. This shifts the dynamic from telling
the public how things are to answering and solving together common concerns
and predicaments raised by individuals. The findings (Article III) also
demonstrate that, in the context of issues where expertise pertains to everyday
life, such as healthy eating, journalists may also consider expertise in the
clientelist terms of how the experts consulted can serve to provide advice
directly addressing and being useful for active individuals seeking expert
advice on making consumption choices. This, in turn, feeds into the social
shaping and expansion of expertise in that, especially when journalists find it
crucial to address the concerns of active consumers, social actors who are
willing and oriented to provide actionable advice addressing such concerns
can be favoured as expert sources instead of sources who are not willing to do
so, or who come to question the relevance of such concerns.
Second, the findings also theoretically complement previous notions about
the role of appealing to individuals in constructing expert authority in public
(Shapin, 2007a; also Penders, 2014) by demonstrating the dialectical nature
and dynamics of how appeals to individuals work in critical relation to the
authority of expert institutions and institutional expert advice to the public
(Article II). Article II especially makes explicit two important aspects
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regarding this dialectical dynamic. It shows how the popular diet bloggers
studied in the article, as new types of actors striving for dietary authority,
present quantitative information gained through personal health
measurement tests as valuable for individual dietary considerations and in
critical relation to the authoritativeness of abstract, population-level nutrition
guidance by institutional expert authorities. Furthermore, it shows how these
popular diet bloggers constructed a sense of a kind of moral community with
their readers as individuals who take control of healthy eating and who think
for themselves, instead of relying on institutional guidance, and, for whom the
bloggers are seen as authoritative freedom fighters for the community to
follow. However, in positional contrast, the institutional expert bloggers
studied in Article II notably appealed to their readers as health-conscious
citizens who should realise the benefits of adhering to institutional dietary
guidance and should not be deceived by opposing claims and the authors
presenting them. Identification of these aspects also further indicates how
expertise in the contemporary public sphere extends beyond the issue of the
technical expertise of social actors (Collins & Evans, 2007; Collins, 2014) in
terms of how this kind of broader dialectical dynamic, that has to do with
individualisation and the authority of expert institutions, figures in the
struggle over, and construction of, expertise and public authority. Moreover,
at a more general level, the identification of these ways in which expert
authority is dialectically constructed arguably adds a new kind of theoretical
and methodological perspective to the relational construction of expertise in
the public sphere and how to study it.
5.3 THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY AND INTERESTS IN THE
RELATIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC EXPERTISE
This dissertation also illuminates how rationality and interest considerations
are involved in the construction and expansion of expertise in the
contemporary public sphere. As for the role of rationality, the results make
explicit two important aspects of how rationality, and the effort to uphold it,
figure in the relational construction of public expertise.
First, Article I contributes to previous notions on how rationalist
underpinnings influence interaction and participation in PES events, which
function as one of the central contemporary public arenas that aim to actively
bridge the expert-lay divide and expand expertise by engaging the public as
knowledgeable participants (Kerr et al., 2007; Horst & Michael, 2011; Michael,
2012; Davies et al., 2012; Davies, 2013; Davies, 2014). Article I provides a
further theoretical and methodological perspective on this by showing how
rationality figures in the relational construction of epistemic authority and the
dynamics of expertise in these types of events. Regarding this, it especially
makes explicit how an effort to achieve rational discussion and deliberation in
dominant, intended framings of social interaction in PES events constructs
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relations of epistemic authority between participants, although these events
might otherwise actively aim to work on the basis of a more expansive notion
of expertise and to dissolve epistemic hierarchy. However, Article I also shows
how participants’ efforts to engage through more agonistic and affective
modes of discussion are a way of countering such rationalist interactional
tendencies and framings, and to negotiate epistemic authority. Participants’
playful and affective commentary can work to indicate the abstract nature of
the rational expert discourse upheld by dominant interactive framings, and
that expert commentary and propositions should instead be tangible with
respect to the daily experience and concerns of the participants to gain
authoritativeness and relevance. These notions make explicit how the
negotiation of expert authority in PES events can centrally have to do with
challenging the dominant rationalist stance on expertise and social interaction
in these events, rather than with challenging the technical understanding or
competence of the expert speakers, or scientific expertise in general.
Second, Article IV demonstrates how an ethos of rationality centrally
constitutes how such visible scientists and scientifically trained professionals
who embrace an explanation-oriented role identity as public experts centrally
conceive and construct their role in terms of a need to uphold scientific
rationality in public arenas and to counter unfounded or problematic
knowledge claims and “myths”, concerning, for example, diet in the context of
healthy eating. Embracing the explanation-oriented role identity is, then, also
a way to orient and position as a public expert in the contemporary socio-
cultural climate – where a variety of knowledge claims circulate concurrently
and are considered by individuals in relation to their experience – through
attachment to scientific rationality as a response (see also Horst, 2013). This
highlights the relational nature of how experts embracing this role identity
consider public expertise in terms of upholding rationality in relation to
knowledge claims perceived as irrational or unfounded, and to social actors
claiming expert authority who make such claims in public. It also
demonstrates one further aspect of how science-based experts’ considerations
over and approach to acting as public experts exceed the issue of merely
tackling specific technical questions or substantial matters of relevance
emerging from within science. At a more general level, Article IV thus provides
a theoretical perspective on how idealistic considerations over the role of
scientific knowledge and upholding scientific rationality in public regarding
issues having relevance in everyday life can play a constitutive role in how
established, science-based experts consider and come to construct their role
as public experts.
Regarding the role of interests, this dissertation complements previous
notions of moral aspects related to the constructedness and public recognition
of expert authority (e.g. Shapin, 1994; Shapin, 1995b; Shapin, 2003; Shapin,
2004; Epstein, 1996; Epstein, 2011) especially by having demonstrated how
the ethical and moral issue concerning expertise and special, or personal,
interests is centrally involved in how journalists, as mediators of expertise and
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expert advice to the public, consider expertise (Article III). This dissertation
also shows how this issue is involved in how some science-based experts
conceive and construct their role identity as public experts (Article IV). As for
the latter, the elaboration of the objectivity-oriented public expert role identity
in Article IV supports the notion (see especially Shapin, 1994) of how
appealing to and displaying disinterestedness, that is, that one is impartial and
does not have any personal vested interest in the production and
communication of knowledge, can work centrally as a way to establish and
maintain epistemic authority in public. However, Article IV draws particular
attention not only to the aspect of how disinterestedness is displayed to the
public regarding specific issues but also to its role in the active enactment of
the objectivity-oriented role identity in relation to other, more subjective ways
of orienting and acting as a public expert by way of placing emphasis on
passivity, neutrality and purely external motives when it comes to providing
expert advice in public, and through boundary drawing in relation to forms of
commentary and engagement that involve subjectivity by portraying that these
belong to the sphere of the political.
Article III importantly shows how regardless of the credentials or
knowledgeability of sources claiming expertise, consideration of special
interests is central in the journalistic judgement of expertise. As elaborated in
Article III, interest considerations are crucial for journalists to keep the
advocacy of special interests under the neutral guise of expertise in critical
check in mediating expert advice to the public. It is shown in the article that
journalists take this as crucial because, in the context of issues such as healthy
eating where expertise is relied upon by the public for guidance regarding what
to do in everyday life, it is typical that various social actors aim to advance
commercial interests by appealing to expertise. However, as institutional or
governmental interests can also be advanced through expert propositions, and
by claiming expert neutrality, interest considerations also apply to the
propositions and advice of institutional experts. This is also true for individual
scientists’ claims that cannot be simply approached as neutral, definitive truth
claims by default, especially if the issue at hand is subject to controversy.
Article III, therefore, also indicates how journalists do not approach the issue
of the interests and moral authority of scientific experts and their public advice
as a straightforward matter of whether to in general choose to place confidence
in scientists as moral actors (see Collins, Weinel & Evans, 2010; Collins &
Evans, 2017) in the case of whom interest considerations and other moral
evaluation are not relevant at all. Rather, journalists approach this in terms of
that, although placing principled confidence in the moral integrity of
scientists, active interest considerations are also of importance when
consulting individual scientists and considering their propositions so as to
avoid presenting as definitive and neutral advice that might be influenced by,
and aimed at advancing, extra-scientific special interests. Or, to make such
potential special interests involved visible to the public so that the public can
take these into account when they consider the advice provided. Interest
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considerations are therefore of relevance in journalism regarding the matter
as to which experts to consult and to attribute with public authority (see
Shapin, 2004 also on this more generally), and whether and how the consulted
experts’ advice and views need to be situated in relation to those of other
experts.
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Through four empirical studies and further theoretical discussion and
elaboration, this dissertation has provided perspectives to how expertise in the
contemporary public sphere is centrally tied to the establishment and
recognition of expert authority, and not just to displaying and assessing
technical expertise. The key findings discussed above make explicit some of
the key aspects and ways in which expert authority of both new types of social
actors claiming expertise and established experts is constructed in relation to
the public, and to each other, in the contemporary public sphere in the context
of issues where expertise touches upon everyday life. Moreover, the findings
advance an empirically grounded understanding of the expansion of expertise
in the context of such issues in public life, and in society more generally.
The results demonstrate especially that a central dynamic in how expertise
in the contemporary public sphere is relationally constructed is how
knowledge drawn upon and advice provided are made tangible, and
considered to bear relevance, in relation to individual experience and actual
daily practices and concerns. However, the results also make explicit that there
is not just one way, but a variety of ways, in which social actors actively
establish expert authority in relation to the public, and strive to maintain it in
relation to other actors claiming expertise, by navigating this dynamic. In
particular, new types of social actors, but also established science-based
experts embracing an engaged expert role identity can centrally strive to
construct their expert authority in the contemporary public sphere by
attempting to draw connections to individual experience, and to serve to
address concerns emerging from the daily life of active consumers. On the
other hand, other visible scientists and scientifically trained experts respond
rather oppositionally to this in order to manage and maintain their expert
authority in the face of such external, socio-cultural pressures over public
expertise. This happens, for example, by self-distancing to emphasise their
objectivity as providers of expert advice in public, or through attachment to
scientific rationality and the need to uphold it.
Moreover, this dissertation has also importantly demonstrated how these
issues of experience, individualisation, rationality and interests (discussed
above in sections 5.1.–5.3.), that exceed the issue of technical expertise, are
also central to how expertise is considered, and becomes socially shaped, in
such cultural practices as journalism and PES activities that centrally mediate
expertise in the contemporary public sphere. In particular, the way in which
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journalists as mediators of expertise judge and make use of expertise is also a
considerably understudied area of arguable relevance to understanding how
expertise in the contemporary public sphere is constructed. This dissertation
has provided new theoretical perspective on this through identification of the
role of such broader considerations, as for example interest considerations, in
the journalistic judgement of expertise. As well as by contributing to how the
journalistic judgement of expertise can be methodologically approached by
focusing on the ways in which journalists themselves account for this, rather
than attempting to focus on how journalists assess expertise specifically in
terms of the technical expertise of their sources as in the substantialist,
normative approach (see Boyce, 2006).
Finally, based on the findings of this dissertation, it can also be more
generally argued that, when it comes to public expertise, there is need to also
problematise a view of expertise either as being “real”, in the sense of
possessing domain-specific technical abilities, or as “relational”, in the sense
of being something deriving from mere social attribution, in the way suggested
by the normative theory of expertise (Collins & Evans, 2007). A central issue
regarding this has to do with the issue of public expertise and competence
because the achievement and recognition of expertise in public arenas do not
merely derive from the domain-specific technical abilities already possessed
by social actors, as the findings in this dissertation also indicate. Acting
skilfully and gaining public recognition as an expert on science-related public
issues is arguably also attributable to abilities that can also be considered to
be real, but which are not reducible to technical abilities. These abilities cannot
be developed within esoteric technical domains and by interacting with other
experts within such domains. One does not come to develop competence as a
public expert, for example, primarily through linguistic socialisation into
expert cultures, which is the means of developing interactional expertise
(Collins & Evans, 2007). Instead, developing competence as a public expert
requires experience of acting and commenting on science-related issues in
public in a certain socio-cultural setting as an expert for the media and more
directly with the public. Crucially, this develops the ability to formulate one’s
expert advice in such a way that it appeals to and is intelligible by the public,
as well as by social actors who mediate expertise to the public. Furthermore, a
competence to recognise and take into consideration the moral and ethical
aspects related to knowledge-intensive public issues, as well as to reflect on
and possibly make visible one’s moral stance, is arguably also an important,
developable competence regarding acting as a public expert.
The above notions make explicit that while possessing technical
competence and understanding is certainly a real ability of use to comment
knowledgeably as a public expert, these kinds of relational competencies are
in no sense less real or relevant when it comes to acting as a public expert, and
to establishing and maintaining expert authority in public. Such relational
competencies, however, are not a kind of universal skill set which one can
come to possess and then universally apply to establish expert authority. This
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is because these are also necessarily socio-culturally conditioned
competencies and inevitably they relate to being in touch with the public and
their concerns, as well as with considering the stances and actions of other
social actors striving for expert authority in public.
49
REFERENCES
Albæk, E. (2011). The interaction between experts and journalists in news
journalism. Journalism, 12(3), 335–348.
Arnoldi, J. (2007). Universities and the public recognition of expertise.
Minerva, 45(1), 49–61.
Barnes, B. & Shapin, S. (Eds.). (1979). Natural Order: Historical Studies of
Scientific Culture. London: SAGE.
Barnes, B., Bloor, D. & Henry, J. (1996). Scientific knowledge: A Sociological
Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: SAGE.
Billig, M. (1991). Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology.
London: SAGE.
Billig, M. (1996). Arguing and Thinking, 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Blume, S. (2006). Anti-vaccination movements and their interpretations.
Social Science & Medicine, 62(3), 628–642.
Boyce, T. (2006). Journalism and expertise. Journalism Studies, 7(6), 889–
906.
Brown, M.F. (2008). Cultural Relativism 2.0. Current Anthropology, 49(3),
363–383.
Cassidy, A. (2006). Evolutionary Psychology as Public Science and Boundary
Work. Public Understanding of Science, 15(2), 175–205.
Castell, S. et al. (2014). Public attitudes to science 2014. London: Ipsos MORI.
Cision. (2011). Cision listasi terveysblogien kymmenen kärjen. Available at:
http://news.cision.com/fi/m-brain-media-oy/r/cision-listasi-
terveysblogien-kymmenen-karjen,g559647
Collins, H. (1983). The sociology of scientific knowledge: Studies of
contemporary science. Annual Review of Sociology, 9(1), 265–285.
Collins, H. (2001). One More Round with Relativism. In: Collins, H. &
Labinger, J. A. (eds.) The One Culture? A Conversation about Science.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 184–195.
Collins, H. (2004). Gravity's Shadow: The Search for Gravitational Waves.
Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
Collins, H. (2011). Language and practice. Social Studies of Science, 41(2),
271–300.
Collins, H. (2014). Are We All Scientific Experts Now? Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Collins, H. & Evans, R. (2002). The third wave of science studies: Studies of
expertise and experience. Social Studies of Science, 32(2), 235–296.
50
Collins, H. & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking expertise. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Collins, H. & Evans, R. (2017). Why Democracies Need Science. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Collins, H., & Weinel, M. (2011). Transmuted expertise: How technical non-
experts can assess experts and expertise. Argumentation, 25(3), 401–413.
Collins, H., Weinel, M. & Evans, R. (2010). The politics and policy of the Third
Wave: new technologies and society. Critical Policy Studies, 4(2), 185–201.
Conrad, P. (1999). Uses of expertise: Sources, quotes, and voice in the
reporting of genetics in the news. Public Understanding of Science 8(4),
285–302.
Davies, S. R. (2013). The rules of engagement: Power and interaction in
dialogue events. Public Understanding of Science, 22(1), 65–79.
Davies, S. R. (2014). Knowing and Loving: Public Engagement beyond
Discourse. Science & Technology Studies, 27(3), 90–110.
Davies, S. R., Selin, C., Gano, G., & Pereira, Â. G. (2012). Citizen engagement
and urban change: Three case studies of material deliberation. Cities,
29(6), 351–357.
Davies, S. R. & Horst, M. (2016). Science Communication: Culture, Identity
and Citizenship. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dreyfus, S. E. (2004). The five-stage model of adult skill acquisition. Bulletin
of Science, Technology & Society, 24(3), 177–181.
Epstein, S. (1995). The construction of lay expertise: AIDS activism and the
forging of credibility in the reform of clinical trials. Science, Technology, &
Human Values, 20(4), 408–437.
Epstein, S. (1996). Impure science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of
Knowledge. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Epstein, S. (2011). Misguided boundary work in studies of expertise: Time to
return to the evidence. Critical Policy Studies, 5(3), 323–328.
Felt, U. et al. (2007). Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously. Report
of the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy
and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Research, European
Commission. Brussels: European Commission.
Fuhrman, E. R. & Oehler, K. (1986). Discourse Analysis and Reflexivity. Social
Studies of Science, 16(2), 293–307.
Gans, H.J. (1979). Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News,
NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late
Modern Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-work and the Demarcation of Science from
Non-science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists.
American Sociological Review 48(6), 781–795.
Gieryn, T. F. (1999). Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the line.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
51
Gilbert, G. N. & Mulkay, M. (1984). Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological
Analysis of Scientists' Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An Essay on the Organization of
Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gunnarsson, A., & Elam, M. (2012). Food fight! The Swedish low-carb/high
fat (LCHF) movement and the turning of science popularisation against the
scientists. Science as Culture, 21(3), 315–334.
Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol. 1): Reason
and the Rationalisation of Society. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action (Vol. 2): Lifeworld
and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston, MA: Beacon
Press.
Halfpenny, P. (1988). Talking of talking, writing of writing: some reflections
on Gilbert and Mulkay's discourse analysis. Social Studies of Science, 18(1),
169–182.
Hallin, D.C. (1986). The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Hartelius, E. J. (2008). The Rhetoric of Expertise. Doctoral dissertation, The
University of Texas at Austin.
Herbst, S. (2003). Political authority in a mediated age. Theory and Society,
32(4), 481–503.
Horst, M. (2013). A field of expertise, the organization, or science itself?
Scientists’ perception of representing research in public communication.
Science Communication, 35(6), 758–779.
Horst, M. & Michael, M. (2011). On the shoulders of idiots: Re-thinking
science communication as ‘event’. Science as Culture, 20(3), 283–306.
Jasanoff, S. (1990). The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jasanoff, S. (1995). Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in
America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jasanoff, S. (2003). Breaking the waves in science studies: Comment on H.M.
Collins and Robert Evans, ‘The third wave of science studies'. Social Studies
of Science, 33(3), 389–400.
Jauho, M. (2016). The social construction of competence: Conceptions of
science and expertise among proponents of the low-carbohydrate high-fat
diet in Finland. Public Understanding of Science, 25(3), 332–345.
Kerr, A., Cunningham-Burley, S. & Tutton, R. (2007). Shifting subject
positions: Experts and lay people in public dialogue. Social Studies of
Science, 37(3), 385–411.
Kurath, M. & Gisler, P. (2009). Informing, involving or engaging? Science
communication, in the ages of atom-, bio-and nanotechnology. Public
Understanding of Science, 18(5), 559–573.
Lam, A. (2010). From ‘Ivory Tower Traditionalists’ to ‘Entrepreneurial
Scientists’? Academic Scientists in Fuzzy University—Industry Boundaries.
Social Studies of Science, 40(2), 307–340.
52
Lamont, M. & Swidler, A. (2014). Methodological pluralism and the
possibilities and limits of interviewing. Qualitative Sociology, 37(2), 153–
171.
Lynch, M. (2014). From Normative to Descriptive and Back: Science and
Technology Studies and the Practice Turn. In: Soler, L., Zwart S., Lynch, M.
& Israel-Jost, V. (eds.) Science After the Practice Turn in the Philosophy,
History, and Social Studies of Science. London: Routledge, 93–113.
Lynch, M., Cole, S. A., McNally, R. & Jordan, K. (2008). Truth machine: The
Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lyne, J. & Howe, H. F. (1990). The rhetoric of expertise: EO Wilson and
sociobiology. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 76(2), 134–151.
Lövbrand, E., Pielke Jr, R. & Beck, S. (2011). A democracy paradox in studies
of science and technology. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 36(4),
474–496.
Maasen, S. & Weingart, P. (Eds.). (2005). Democratization of expertise?
Exploring novel forms of scientific advice in political decision-making.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Merton, R. K. (1973). The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical
Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, R. K. (1976). Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays. New York:
The Free Press.
Michael, M. (2012). “What are we busy doing?” Engaging the Idiot. Science,
Technology, & Human Values, 37(5), 528–554.
Miller, C. R. (2003). The presumptions of expertise: The role of ethos in risk
analysis. Configurations, 11(2), 163–202.
Miller, J. & Glassner, B. (1997) 'The “Inside” and the “Outside”: Finding
Realities in Interviews'. In: Silverman, D. (ed.) Qualitative Research:
Theory, Method and Practice. London: SAGE, 99–112.
Moore, A. & Stilgoe, J. (2009). Experts and Anecdotes: The Role of ‘‘Anecdotal
Evidence’’ in Public Scientific Controversies. Science, Technology, &
Human Values, 34(5), 654–677.
Nowotny, H. (2000). Transgressive competence: The narrative of expertise.
European Journal of Social Theory, 3(1), 5–21.
Nowotny, H. (2003). Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge.
Science and Public Policy, 30(3), 151–156.
Orbuch, T. L. (1997). People's accounts count: The sociology of accounts.
Annual Review of Sociology, 23(1), 455–478.
Parry, S. (2009). Stem Cell Scientists' Discursive Strategies for Cognitive
Authority. Science as Culture, 18(1), 89–114.
Penders, B. (2014). Mythbusters: Credibilising strategies in popular nutrition
books by academics. Public Understanding of Science, 23(8), 903–910.
Peters, H. P. (2008). Scientists as public experts. In: Bucchi M & Trench B
(eds.), Handbook of public communication of science and technology. New
York: Routledge, 131–146.
53
Potter, J. (1996). Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social
Construction. London: SAGE.
Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond
Attitudes and Behaviour. London: SAGE.
Powell, M. C., & Colin, M. (2008). Meaningful citizen engagement in science
and technology: What would it really take? Science Communication, 30(1),
126–136.
Radstake, M., van den Heuvel?Vromans, E., Jeucken, N., Dortmans, K. &
Nelis, A. (2009). Societal dialogue needs more than public engagement.
EMBO reports, 10(4), 313–317.
Reich, Z. (2009). Sourcing the News: Key Issues in Journalism – An
Innovative Study of the Israeli Press. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Rijswoud, E. van (2012). Public faces of science: Experts and identity work in
the boundary zone of science, policy and public debate. Doctoral
dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen.
Rijswoud, E. van (2014). Shifting expert configurations and the public
credibility of science: Boundary work and identity work of hydraulic
engineers (1980–2009). Science in Context, 27(3), 531–558.
Rip, A. (1985). Experts in Public Arenas. In: Otway, H. & Peltu, M. (eds.)
Regulating Industrial Risks: Science, Hazards, and Public Protection.
London: Butterworth, 94–110.
Rip, A. (2003). Constructing expertise: In a third wave of science studies?
Social Studies of Science, 33(3), 419–434.
Rödder, S. & Schäfer, M. S. (2010). Repercussion and resistance. An empirical
study on the interrelation between science and mass media.
Communications, 35(3), 249–267.
Schudson, M. (2003). The Sociology of News. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Scott, M. B. & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review,
33(1), 46–62.
Setälä, V. & Väliverronen, E. (2014). Fighting fat: the role of ‘field experts’ in
mediating science and biological citizenship. Science as Culture, 23(4),
517–536.
Shapin, S. (1984). Talking History: Reflections on Discourse Analysis. Isis,
75(1), 125–130.
Shapin, S. (1994). A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in
Seventeenth-Century England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shapin, S. (1995a). Cordelia's love: Credibility and the Social Studies of
Science. Perspectives on Science 3(3): 255–275.
Shapin, S. (1995b). Trust, Honesty, and the Authority of Science. In: Bulger,
R.E., Bobby, E.M. & Fineberg, H.V. (eds.) Society’s Choices: Social and
Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine. Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 388–408.
Shapin, S. (2003). Trusting George Cheyne: Scientific expertise, common
sense, and moral authority in early eighteenth-century dietetic medicine.
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 77(2), 263–297.
54
Shapin, S. (2004). The way we trust now: The authority of science and the
character of the scientist. In: Hoodbhoy, P., Glaser, D. & Shapin, S (eds.)
Trust Me, I’m A Scientist. London: The British Council, 42–63.
Shapin, S. (2007a). Expertise, Common Sense, and the Atkins Diet. In: Porter,
J. & Phillips, P. (eds.) Public Science in Liberal Democracy. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 174–193.
Shapin, S. (2007b). Science and the Modern World. In: Hackett, E.,
Amsterdamska O., Lynch, M. & Wajcman, J. (eds.) The Handbook of
Science and Technology Studies, 3rd edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
433–448.
Shapin, S. & Barnes, B. (1976). Head and Hand: Rhetorical Resources in
British Pedagogical Writing, 1770?1850. Oxford Review of Education, 2(3),
231–254.
Smith, T. W., & Son, J. (2013). Trends in public attitudes about confidence in
institutions. Chicago: NORC.
Tannen, D. & Wallat, C. (1987). Interactive frames and knowledge schemas in
interaction: Examples from a medical examination/interview. Social
Psychology Quarterly, 205–216.
Tanner, A.H. (2004). Agenda Building, Source Selection, and Health News at
Local Television Stations: A nationwide survey of local television health
reporters. Science Communication, 25(4), 350–363.
Taylor, C. A. (1992). Of Audience, Expertise and Authority: The evolving
creationism debate. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 78(3), 277–295.
Turner, S. (2003). Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts.
London: SAGE.
Weber, M. [1921–22] (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive
sociology (Vol. 1). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Weingart, P. (1998). Science and the media. Research Policy, 27(8), 869–879.
Wynne, B. (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: social identities and
public uptake of science. Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304.
Wynne, B. (1996). May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-
Lay Knowledge Divide. In Lash, S., Szerszynski, B. & Wynne, B. (eds). Risk,
Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology. London: SAGE,
44–83.
Wynne, B. (2003). Seasick on the third wave? Subverting the hegemony of
propositionalism: Response to Collins & Evans (2002). Social Studies of
Science, 33(3), 401–417.
Ylikoski, P. (2016). Harry Collins and the Crisis of Expertise. Science &
Education, 25(3-4), 461–464.
Zelizer, B. (1993). Journalists as interpretive communities. Critical Studies in
Mass Communication, 10(3), 219–237.
